DON\u27T FENCE ME IN: REFORMING TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW TO BETTER FACILITATE CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER by Mitchell, Andrew D. & Hepburn, Jarrod
Yale Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 19 | Issue 1 Article 4
2018
DON'T FENCE ME IN: REFORMING TRADE




Professor, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne
Jarrod Hepburn
Postdoctoral Fellow, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and
Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Yale
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized editor of Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
julian.aiken@yale.edu.
Recommended Citation
Andrew D. Mitchell & Jarrod Hepburn, DON'T FENCE ME IN: REFORMING TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW TO BETTER
FACILITATE CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFER, 19 Yale J.L. & Tech (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/4
DON'T FENCE ME IN:
REFORMING TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW TO
BETTER FACILITATE CROSS-BORDER DATA
TRANSFER*
Andrew D. Mitchellt & Jarrod Hepburn$
19 YALE J. L. & TECH. 182 (2017)
ABSTRACT
The transfer of data across borders supports trade in most
service industries around the world as well as the growth of
traditional manufacturing sectors. However, several countries
have begun to adopt laws impeding the cross-border transfer of
data, ostensibly in pursuit of policy objectives such as national
security, public morals or public order, and privacy. Such
domestic measures create potential concerns under both
international trade law and international investment law.
Accordingly, recent trade and investment negotiations such as
the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) include specific
provisions mandating the permissibility of cross-border data
transfer and prohibiting data localization in certain
circumstances. Although World Trade Organization law
contains no such specific provisions, restrictive data transfer
measures could breach the non-discrimination and market
access disciplines under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), except to the extent that they are justified
under the general exception in GATS art. XIV. International
investment law may also apply to measures restricting data
transfer, particularly if investment arbitrators take into account
holistic changes in the digital economy to interpret the scope of
covered investments and the meaning of investment obligations.
The application of general trade and investment law disciplines
to data transfer restrictions and localization requirements
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remain uncertain. The more specific provisions in the TPP,
while welcome, fail to address this uncertainty. These fields
must be better synchronized with each other in respect of data
transfer and with the realities of the digital economy. A
comprehensive legal framework-including coverage of trade
and investment law-and extensive policy coordination across a
variety of stakeholders would better enable open, secure and
efficient data flows across borders.
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I INTRODUCTION
The unprecedented growth of digital information has
resulted in the expansion of new-age business models that rely
on the ability to collect, aggregate, process, and transfer
information across borders via the Internet to generate
revenues and new business opportunities. 1 The rapid
development of the Internet as a business platform has thus
led to significant increases in international trade,2 innovation, 3
and business productivity, as data transfer capabilities help
reduce transaction costs and enhance real-time resource
management.4 Importantly, cross-border data flows add value
not only to services and e-commerce industries, but also to
manufacturing. A study by McKinsey Global Institute in 2011
found that 75% of the value added by the Internet goes to the
traditional manufacturing sector. 5 Another study by the
McKinsey Global Institute in 2016 estimated that all forms of
global flows (such as goods, services and capital flows)
increased global GDP by at least 10% (which amounted to USD
7.8 trillion), of which Internet data flows made up USD 2.8
trillion.6 These figures highlight the broad economic potential
of the Internet as a business platform for many aspects of
international trade and foreign investment.7
I Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, 12 Innovation
Pol'y & Econ. 65, 83-84 (2012).
2 JOSHUA P. MELTZER, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET AND TRANSATLANTIC
DATA FLOWS FOR U.S. AND EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT 7 (2014); SUSAN STONE
SUSAN, JAMES MESSENT & DOROTHEE FLAIG, EMERGING POLICY ISSUES:
LOCALISATION BARRIERS TO TRADE (2015). U.S.
3 SOFTWARE & INDUSTRY INFORMATION ASSOCIATION, DATA-DRIVEN INNOVATION:
A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS: UNDERSTANDING AND ENABLING ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL VALUE OF DATA (2013).
http://archive.siia.net/index.php?option=com-doeman&task=docview&gid=4
268&Itemid=318.
4 JOSHUA P. MELTZER, SUPPORTING THE INTERNET AS A PLATFORM FOR
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (2014) [hereinafter SUPPORTING THE INTERNET];
Joshua P. Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows and International
Trade, 2 Asia & the Pacific Pol'y Studies 90, 92 (2014) [hereinafter THE
INTERNET, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS]; UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION, DIGITAL TRADE IN THE U.S, AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES, PART 2 65
(2014). U.S.
5 MATTHIEU PALISSIE DU RAUSAS, JAMES MANYIKA, ERIC HAZAN, JACQUES
BUGHIN, MICHAEL CHUI & REMI SAID, INTERNET MATTERS: THE NETS SWEEPING
IMPACT ON GROWTH, JOBS, AND PROSPERITY 1 (2011).,
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high tech telecoms internet/internet mat
ters.
6 JAMES MANYIKA, SUSAN LUND, JACQUES BUGHIN, JONATHAN WOETZEL, KALIN
STAMENOV & DHRUv DHINGRA, DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION: THE NEW ERA OF
GLOBAL FLOWS 1 (2016); See also UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, DATA PROTECTION REGULATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DATA
FLOWS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT xi (2016).
7 SUPPORTING THE INTERNET, supra note 4, at vi.
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Although international data transfer assists both
businesses and consumers, while generating benefits for the
economy at large, several countries (both developing and
developed) have imposed restrictions on the cross-border flow
of data. 8 The proffered justifications for such restrictions
include policy concerns like safeguarding privacy and security,9
but digital protectionism may also be at play, 10 entailing for
example the promotion of the local information and
communications technology industry either directly by
providing preferential treatment in government procurement
to domestic cloud computing companies, or indirectly by
coercing foreign companies to locate their servers domestically.
These restrictions tend to reduce market access for foreign
suppliers of digital services, impeding trade and investment
opportunities and increasing the costs and service choice of
individual businesses.11
The need to facilitate data transfer is a global concern, 12
but few specific rules on data transfer (or data protection) exist
at the international level. Meltzer has proposed the World
Trade Organization (WTO) as a forum for developing the
necessary rules, for example by expanding WTO Members'
commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) 13 to cover the scope of online trade.1 4 However,
even with regard to specific commercial aspects such as e-
commerce, discussions within the WTO have been marginal,
with more high-profile discussion of the digital economy
occurring within the human rights institutions. 15 More
progress has been made at plurilateral rather than multilateral
levels, with the new wave of mega-regional agreements
8 These include developed countries in the EU and Australia and Korea, as
well as developing countries such as China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Nigeria and Russia.
9 See generally CHRISTOPHER KUNER, REGULATION OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS
UNDER DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
(2011).
10 Shahmel Azmeh & Christopher Foster, The TPP and the digital trade
agenda: Digital industrial policy and Silicon Valley's influence on new trade
agreements 11 (LSE International Development, Working Paper No. 16-175,
2016).
11 Cross-Border Data Flows: Could Foreign Protectionism Hurt U.S. Jobs?
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, H. of Rep., 113th Cong., 8 (2015) (statement of Linda
Dempsey, Vice President of International Economic Affairs, National
Association of Manufacturers).
12 Lingjie Kong, Data Protection and Transborder Data Flow in the European
and Global Context, 21 EUR. J. OFINT'LL. 441, 456 (2010).
13 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization annex 1B,
opened for signature 15 April 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
14 THE INTERNET, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, supra note 4, at 99.
15 Julian Braithwaite, Ambassador and Permanent Representative, UK Mission
to the UN and Other Int'l Org., Discussion at the Trade and Development
Symposium (16 December 2015).
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containing specific obligations related to cross-border data flow.
For example, the final text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement (TPP),16 signed by 12 countries in February 2016,
contains such provisions, which have also been proposed in the
ongoing negotiations towards the Trade in Services Agreement
(TiSA) 17 and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP).18
In this article, we argue that existing rules of
international trade and investment law do not protect cross-
border data transfer in a consistent, coherent and predictable
manner. In part II, we explain the types of data restrictions
that countries have implemented in recent years and the most
common rationales put forward by such countries for these
restrictions. We highlight the impossibility of characterizing a
given measure as lawful or unlawful, legitimate or illegitimate,
purely on the basis of its ostensible rationale. In part III, we
investigate how such restrictions are currently addressed in
international trade law (focusing on the WTO and the TPP),
concluding that restrictions on cross-border data transfer may
give rise to a number of potential violations, save for the
availability of specific exceptions subject to stringent
conditions. The application of the general WTO rules is
uncertain. The specific provisions in the TPP, while more
directed, reflect a failure to achieve consensus even among a
limited number of countries on the necessary balance between
free flow of data and recognition of other policy objectives.
In part IV, we show that threshold requirements in a
typical investment treaty, of an "investment" "in the territory
of the host state", are likely to be satisfied in respect of
businesses engaging in cross-border data transfer, despite some
complications with their business models in comparison to
more traditional industries. However, restrictions on cross-
border data transfer will not necessarily amount to violations
16 Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016,
http://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/tpp/official-documents/Pages/official-
documents.aspx [hereinafter TPP].
17 The latest draft of the Annex on Electronic Commerce was leaked on May 25,
2016 by Wikileaks. See Trade in Service Agreement: Annex on Electronic
Commerce art 2., WIKILEAKS (May 25, 2016),
https://wikileads.org/tisa/document/20151001_Annex-on-Electronic-
Commerce/2015 1001_Annex-on-Electronic-Commerce.pdf.
18 Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Proposal for Trade in
Services, Investment and E-Commerce 47-50 (July 31, 2015),
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/july/tradoc 153669.pdf 47-50. The
EU proposal does not contain any proposals related to cross-border transfer of
information. In the latest draft, leaked by Greenpeace on May 1. 2016, the
U.S. proposal for the provision on cross-border flow of information can be
found. For more details, see Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership:
Consolidated Proposed Electronic Communications/ Telecommunications Text
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of key investment protections, even in more modern
agreements providing for data transfer commitments such as
the TPP.
After analyzing the present application of trade and
investment law to data transfer, Part V sets out a number of
normative and policy reforms that treaty-makers and
adjudicators could adopt in order to facilitate freer cross-border
transfer of data. Part V observes that better coordination is
needed between international trade and investment law with
respect to data transfer, and also between trade and
investment laws on the one hand and the realities of the digital
economy on the other. Open, secure, and efficient data flows
across borders require a comprehensive legal framework,
including trade and investment law disciplines, as well as
extensive policy coordination across a variety of stakeholders.
Part V thus proposes a dual-pronged strategy of internal and
external engagement to achieve this coordination and to secure
the future of cross-border data transfer.
II RESTRICTIONS ON CROSS-BORDER DATA TRANSFERS
AND THEIR UNDERLYING RATIONALES
A number of governments have established restrictions
on cross-border data transfer, particularly in recent years,
offering various legitimate policy objectives as justifications.
Before turning to an assessment of these restrictions under
international trade and investment law, we explore these
objectives and their relationship to the restrictions undertaken.
As with many regulations, the difficulty is in distinguishing the
protectionist aspects of data transfer restrictions from genuine
policy objectives unrelated to trade and investment. The
following brief review demonstrates that the dividing line
between legitimate regulation and protectionist intervention
must be drawn on a case-by-case basis and that reasonable
arguments may be put forward on both sides. As detailed
further in parts III and IV below, the specific crafting of the
challenged measure and the language and practice of its
implementation are crucial in determining its permissibility
under trade and investment law.
A Storing Data Locally to Protect National Security
National security is a common rationale for restricting
data transfers in a number of countries. The government
procurement policies of many countries require that data
related to national security and the defense sector be stored in
188
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domestic servers. 19 Further, countries such as Russia, 20
Vietnam,2 1 and Indonesia 22 view data sovereignty as a matter
of national security and protection against foreign surveillance.
Countries may also impose restrictions on cross-border data
flows in connection with critical infrastructure sectors,
particularly with respect to government data. For example,
both Germany 23 and France 24 are working towards establishing
local clouds for government data. Some commentators have
questioned the effectiveness of such restrictions to enhance
national security, arguing that foreign surveillance can still be
carried out even if data is stored locally and that data may be
even more vulnerable to security attacks if concentrated in a
single location.25
19 On the requirement of storing sensitive information of public authorities in
servers located within Germany, see Beschluss des Rates der IT-
Beauftragten der Ressorts, Nr. 2015/5, July 29, 2015 (Ger.), cited in Matthias
Bauer & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, The Bundes Cloud: Germany on the Edge to
Discriminate against Foreign Suppliers of Digital Services, ECIPE BULLETIN,
September 2015, http://ecipe.org/publications/the-bundes-cloud-germany-on-
the-edge-to-discriminate-against-foreign-suppliers-of-digital-services/. For the
requirement to store all data collected with public funds in local servers in
India, see MINISTRY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, NATIONAL DATA SHARING AND
ACCESSIBILITY POLICY-2012 [10] (March 17, 2012) (Ind.). For the requirement
for auditing for hardware and software used in government communications
in Brazil, see Decreto No. 8.135, de 4 de Novembro de 2013, DiArio Oficial da
Uniio [D.O.U.] de 11.5.2013 (Braz.). See also infra notes 20-24.
20 Federal Law No. 242-FZ "On Amending Certain Legislative Acts of the
Russian Federation for Clarification of the Procedure of Personal Data
Processing in Information and Telecommunication Networks,", dated July 21,
2014, entered into force September 1, 2016.
21 Decree on the Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services and
Online Information, No. 72/2013/ND-CP. art 4.4, art 5 (July 15, 2013) (Viet.).
22 Undang-Undang Tentang Pelayanan Publik [Public Service Law], Law No
25/2009, July 18, 2009 (Government Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia
Year 2009 No. 112), http://www
.setneg.go.id//components/com perundangan/doeviewer.php?id=2274&file
name=UU%2025%2oTahun%202009.pdf. See also Anupam Chander & Uyen
P Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs the Global Internet 19-20 (UC
Davis Legal Studies, Research Paper No 378, 2014)..
23 All cloud computing services purchased by public authorities in Germany
must store sensitive information within Germany. See Beschluss des Rates
der IT-Beauftragten der Ressorts, Nr. 2015/5, July 29, 2015 (Ger.). See Hosuk
Lee-Makiyama & Matthias Bauer, The Bundes Cloud: Germany on the Edge
to Discriminate against Foreign Suppliers of Digital Services ECIPE
BULLETINS (September 2015), http://ecipe.org/publications/the-bundes-cloud-
germany-on-the-edge-to-discriminate-against -foreign-suppliers-of-digital-
services/.
24 Valery Marchive, France Hopes to Turn PRISM Worries Into Cloud
Opportunities, ZDNET(Jun. 21, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/france-
hopes-to-turn-prism -worries-into-cloud-opportunities/; Valery Marchive,
Cloud Firms Demand Right to Use French Government's C285m "sovereign
cloud", ZDNET (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/cloud-firms-
demand-right -to-use-french-governments-eur285m-sovereign-cloud/.
25 Chander & Le, sura note 22, at 30.
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B Preventing Access to Certain Online Content to Protect
Public Morals or Public Order
The 'Great Firewall' in China 26 (coupled with highly
restrictive domestic regulations on cross-border data transfer)27
has created strong impediments to the flow of data across
Chinese borders. The purpose of these Chinese laws and
policies is to ensure that all online content that is circulated
within China is in line with important public values,
particularly pertaining to maintaining public order and
protecting the nation's public morals. 28 In 2016, the United
States Trade Representative ('USTR') officially identified these
restrictions as a barrier to trade in its National Trade Estimate
Report. 29
Several other countries also impose restrictions on
online data transfer in particular sectors for reasons of 'public
order' or 'public morals'. These restrictions may apply generally
to online services or websites (whether local or international),
or only to transfers from outside the country's territory. The
latter type of restriction may be harder to justify on moral
grounds. Countries including Singapore, 30 Lebanon 31 and
Turkey 32 ban adult entertainment websites, while Germany
bans the sale of Nazi memorabilia on e-commerce websites. 33
26 The term "Great Firewall of China" was coined by Barme and Ye, referring to
the online censorship and surveillance tools employed by the Chinese
Ministry of Public Security. See Geremerie R. Balme & Sang Ye, The Great
Firewall of China, WIRED (Jan. 6, 1997),
https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3/ . See also How Censorship Works in
China: A Brief Overview, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/china0806/3.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2017).
27 See, e.g., M 4NAA jAflf AGEJi MM[Information
Security Technology - Guidelines for Personal Information Protection Within
Public and Commercial Services Information Systems] (effective Feb. 1, 2013)
(China); Cybersecurity Law (Draft) (Second Reading Draft), CHINA LAW
TRANSLATE ( April 7, 2016),
http://chinalawtranslate.com/cybersecurity2/?1ang=en.
28 Shi Hao, Liu Fei & Wang Jianhua, Commentary: China's Internet Regulation
Not Trade Barrier, XINHUANET (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-04/14/c_135279379.htm. See also
Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
Management Regulations art 4-6 (approved by St. Council on Dec. 11, 1997,
promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on Dec. 30, 1997) (China).
29 UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, THE 2016 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT 91 (2016).
30 Internet Code of Practice, art. 4 (1 November 1997) (Sing.).
31 Mohammed Najem, Lebanon Bans Six Porn Sites, Sparks Fears of Future
Censorship, GLOBAL VOICES (Sept. 10, 2014,)
<https://advox.globalvoices.org/2014/09/10/lebanon-blocks-six-porn-sites-
sparks-fears -of-further-censorship/>.
32 Mustafa Akgiil & Melih Kirhdog, Internet Censorship in Turkey, 4 INTERNET
POL'Y REV. (2015)<http://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/internet-
censorship -turkey>.
33 STRAFGESETZBUCH [CRIMINAL CODE], § 86a, (Ger.).
190
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Countries such as Iran, 34 Vietnam, 35 and China 36 impose
restrictions on political information that is circulated online for
the purposes of maintaining public order. Therefore, any
information that may be prejudicial to 'national security',
'cultural values' or 'public order' is prohibited from online
circulation. These kinds of regulations have the net effect of
preventing cross-border transfer of data from foreign countries
into countries where specific websites or types of content are
banned. As discussed further below, the WTO Appellate Body
has already decided two disputes involving challenges to
restrictions on online services related to gambling and
audiovisual products, in both of which the respondent (the
United States ('US') and China respectively) justified the
measures on the basis of public morals. 37
The Internet has made it harder for governments to
control the kind of information that their citizens can access
and share. As discussed above, many countries take strong
measures to prevent dissemination of information that may
destabilize the government or is directed against the
predominant belief system, but alternative routes still enable
access to information from blocked websites/portals. For
instance, citizens can access information through virtual
private networks or proxy servers even in countries such as
China, including obtaining access to banned websites such as
Facebook within Chinese borders. 38 The existence of such
34 See generally Simburgh Aryan, Homa Aryan & J. Alex Halderman, Internet
Censorship in Iran: A First Look, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD USENIX
WORKSHOP ON FREE AND OPEN COMMUNICATIONS ON THE INTERNET, (Aug.
2013).
35 Decree on the Management, Provision and Use of Internet Services and
Online Information, No. 72/2013/ND-CP. art 4.4, art 5 (July 15, 2013) (Viet.);
Eva Galperin & Maira Sutton, Vietnam Internet Censorship Bill Goes Into
Effect, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND (Sept. 10, 2013),
<https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/vietnams-internet-censorship-bill-
goes-effect>.
36 Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
Management Regulations art 4-6 (approved by St. Council on Dec. 11, 1997,
promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security on Dec. 30, 1997) (China)
37 Appellate Body Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 95, 294, 296, 301, 313, WTO Doc.
WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. - Gambling];
Appellate Body Report, China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment
Products, ¶ 141, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter China - Publications and Audiovisual Products].
38 See, e.g., Paul Bischoff, 5 Ways to Sneak Through China's Great Firewall,
TECH IN ASIA (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.techinasia.com/5-ways-sneak-
chinas-great-firewall; Simon Denyer, Internet Activists are Finding Ways
Around China's Great Firewall, WASH. POST (June 14, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia pacific/the-cat-and-mouse-game-
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technical workarounds tends to undermine the effectiveness of
such bans and hence their rationale (and, perhaps, their
justifiability under international economic law, as discussed
further below).
C Data Transfer Restrictions to Protect Privacy: EU- US
Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield
A government may feel compelled to restrict data flows
in order to protect its citizens and businesses from breaches of
privacy involving personal or confidential data, leading to the
creation of digital walls between its territory and the rest of the
world. 39 Restrictions on cross-border transfer of data are thus
not unusual in sectors such as health and finance, which are
particularly sensitive to privacy concerns. 40 These kinds of
concerns have the potential to challenge new business models
based on Big Data, which require analysis of huge datasets
collected through various online services and digital
applications. Big Data business models can create benefits such
as projection of customer demand, customization of services
and advertisements, and greater efficiency. However, Big Data
processing technologies may also allow individuals to be
identified by aggregating and deducing from blocks of non-
personal data, usually for commercial purposes such as
targeted advertising, 41 but potentially also for more
problematic purposes such as political repression and
surveillance. Governments have thus expressed concern over
sending and storing citizens' personal information, even in
aggregate form, outside their own borders.
One way around these privacy concerns has been the
negotiation of bilateral agreements between particular
countries that have a degree of confidence in each other's
privacy regimes and benign motives. The former 'Safe Harbor'
agreement between the European Union ('EU') and the U.S.,
for instance, represented an attempt at such an arrangement,
intended to balance privacy with economic concerns. However,
39 JOSEPH WRIGHT, DATA RESTRICTIONS 'REGRETTABLY ON RISE: STRICKLING, Int'l
Trade Daily (Nov. 10, 2015).
40 For example, Australia restricts transfer of e-health records of its residents
on grounds of protecting their privacy (Personally Controlled Electronic
Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) s 77 (Austl.)). China imposes restrictions on
transferring financial information of Chinese citizens abroad for the purposes
of analysis, processing and storage (FtARkR Y J Ik~itJLtfl A
AMEM~PIf~~t~ifn [Notice to Urge Banking Financial Institutions to
Protect Personal Information] (promulgated by the People's Bank of China,
Jan. 21, 2011, effective May 1, 2011) PEKING U. LAW,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=187253&lib=law (China).
41 See Diane MacDonald & Christine Streatfeild, Personal Data Privacy and the
WTO, 36 HouS. J. INTL L. 625, 644 (2014).
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the agreement also highlighted a philosophical gap between the
two jurisdictions with respect to privacy. While the EU
considers safeguarding of personal data a human right, the
U.S. sees the issue of data protection mainly in the terms of
consumer protection. 42 In the European legal system, Directive
95/46/EC prohibited transfer of personal data to third countries
lacking adequate data protection.43 To facilitate data transfer
between the EU and the U.S., the two sides concluded the 'Safe
Harbor' agreement in 2000, allowing firms to transfer data
from the EU to the U.S. if the firms self-certified that they
provided safeguards equivalent to those required by the EU
Directive.44 When the Safe Harbor agreement was first signed,
"the [I]nternet was in its infancy," and the transatlantic flow of
data was insubstantial. 45 However, the exponential increase in
data transfer 6 and high-profile data security breaches, such as
Edward Snowden's leaks regarding the U.S. National Security
Agency ('NSA') in 2013, led to tension between the parties.4 7
Following the NSA leaks, an Austrian privacy activist,
Maximillian Schrems, raised concerns that his right to privacy
was being compromised when his personal data, given to
Facebook through his use of the site, was transferred to U.S.-
based servers under the Safe Harbor agreement. After various
proceedings in Ireland, the case was transferred to the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).4 8 On October 6, 2015, the
ECJ decided that the Safe Harbor agreement compromised the
essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as it
42 An Ocean Apart: Online Privacy in Europe, THE ECONOMIST ESPRESSO (Dec.
15, 2015), https://espresso.economist.com/90f6536e97bef229cfa3dc415f5a7f64.
43 Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281);
Lingjie Kong, Data Protection and Transborder Data Flow in the European
and Global Context, 21 EUR. J. INT'L.L. 441, 441 (2010).
44 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC, of 26 July 2000 Pursuant to Directive
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of
the Protection provided by the Safe Harbour Privacy Principles and Related
Frequently Asked Questions Issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce,
2000 O.J. (L 215) art. 1, 2. U.S.
45 Get off of my Cloud; Data and privacy, THE ECONOMIST 61-2 (Oct. 10, 2015).
46 "Data flows between the U.S. and the EU are the largest in the world:
approximately 55 percent higher than those between the U.S. and Asia, and
40 percent higher than those between the U.S. and Latin America." Joshua P.
Meltzer, Examining the EU safe harbor decision and impacts for
transatlantic data flows, BROOKINGS (Nov. 3, 2015),
<http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2015/11/03-eu-safe-harbor-
decision-transatlantic-data-flows-meltzer>.
47 Get off of my Cloud; Data and privacy, supra note 45.
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enabled U.S. public authorities to have general access to the
content of electronic communications. 49
Following the invalidation of the Safe Harbor
agreement by the ECJ in Schrems v Data Protection
Commissioner, the EU and U.S. adopted a new legal
framework known as the Privacy Shield,50 which applies to
4,400 companies following its entry into force in July 2016.51
The EU-U.S. Privacy Shield regulates the transatlantic flow of
personal data,5 2 imposing stronger obligations on the U.S. side
than the previous Safe Harbor agreement. Nevertheless, the
new agreement has also seen strong objections by EU-level
bodies such as the Article 29 Working Party, 53 European
Parliament,54 and European Data Protection Supervisor, 55 and
may itself be subject to legal challenge before the European
courts, 56 particularly when the General Data Protection
Regulation comes into force in 2018.57
In recent years, individual EU countries have also been
imposing restrictions on cross-border data transfer. For
instance, in 2016, the French Data Protection Authority fined
Google for violating the so-called "right to be forgotten,"
relating to the processing and deletion of personal data from
search engine results delivered into particular jurisdictions.5 8
49 Id. at ¶¶ 94, 78.
50 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1.
51 European Commission Press Release, European Commission Launches EU-
U.S. Privacy Shield: Stronger Protection for Transatlantic Data Flows (July
12, 2016); Stephen Gardner, EU Countries Green Light Data Transfer Privacy
Shield, BLOOMBERG LAW: PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY (July 8, 2016),
https://www.bna.com/eu-countries-green-n57982076798/.
52 Commission Implementing Decision 2016/1250, ¶f 14-18, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1.
53 See generally Statement, Article 29 Working Party, Statement of the Article
29 Working Party on the Opinion on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield (April 13,
2016), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/press-
material/press-
release/art29 press material/2016/press release shield-en.pdf.
54 Catherine Stupp, Parliament asks Commission to renegotiate Privacy Shield,
EURACTIV (May 27, 2016),
http://www. euractiv.com/section/digital/news/parliament-asks-commission-to-
renegotiate-privacy-shield/.
55 See Opinion of European Data Protection Supervisor on the EU-US Privacy
Shield Draft Adequacy Decision (May 30, 2016),
<https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Docum
ents/Consultation/Opinions/2016/16-05-30 Privacy Shield EN.pdf.>.
56 See, e.g., Jack Caporal, European Data Officials Not Satisfied with Final
Privacy Shield Text, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (July 29, 2016). U.S.
57 Commission Regulation 95/46, On the Protection of Natural Persons with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such
Data, and Repealing Directive, 2016 (L 119) 1 (hereinafter General Data
Protection Regulation).
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Outside the EU, Australia59 and certain Canadian provinces6 o
have also invoked privacy as the basis for restricting cross-
border data flows.
The common resort to restrictions on data transfer as a
means of protecting privacy, in a number of countries,
demonstrates the significance of this policy objective, despite
the potential damage to international trade and investment
arising from such restrictions. However, the discrepancies in
approach between jurisdictions, such as between the EU and
the U.S., exemplify the complexities of this area and the
difficulties in reaching agreement on how such measures
should be addressed in international trade and investment law.
III DATA FLOWS UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
The existing WTO laws largely predate the pervasive
nature of data transactions today.61 In applying WTO law to
such restrictions, as we explain below in part IIIA, much
depends on the specific design and implementation of the
measure, its impact on trade, and its connection to relevant
policy rationales. Potential difficulties arise in classifying data
transfers under the broad concepts of goods and services in the
WTO. The WTO does provide useful concepts and tools for
analyzing some of the policy objectives associated with data
transfer restrictions, particularly in the form of general
exceptions (including reference to privacy, 62 public morals, and
public order) and national security exceptions. However,
relying solely on these overarching exceptions may have the
effect of deferring international consensus on the appropriate
regulation of data and data transfer, in the meantime leaving
much to the discretion of WTO panels and the Appellate Body.
More modern approaches to addressing data transfer in
international trade law are found in newer agreements such as
the recently concluded TPP, as we outline in part IIIB below.
By recognizing objectives such as consumer protection in e-
59 Australia restricts transfer of e-health records of its residents on grounds of
protecting their privacy. See Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records
Act 2012 (Cth) s 77 (Austl.).
60 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, s 30.1
(B.C.); Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, N.S.
2006, s 5 (N.S.).
61 John A. Drennan, J. Michael Taylor, Joseph Laroski, Alexander K. Haas &
Julie A. Stockton, Privacy Law, Cross-Border Data Flows and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement: What Counsel Need to Know, BLOOMBERG:
PRIVACY & SECURITY LAW REPORT (14 December 7, 2015),
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/2015articles/
12-07-15 Bloomberg-BNA-Privacy-and-Security-Law-Report.pdf..
62 Id.. See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
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commerce, the TPP parties have enhanced possibilities for
cooperation and policy coordination between themselves to
ensure safe and secure cross-border transfer of data, through
transparent and coherent laws on data transfer that balance
digital trade liberalization with other objectives including
privacy. 63 The significance of the TPP provisions for the free
flow of data across borders depends, of course, on that
agreement entering into force. Meanwhile, as we note in part
IIIC, the EU position may prevent the inclusion of similar
provisions specific to data transfer in TTIP and TiSA.
Moreover, as discussed further below, even the specific TPP
provisions have significant gaps that need to be filled by
international standards to be developed through further
coordination.
A Uncertain Application of WTO Law to Restrictions on
Cross-Border Data Transfer
In the WTO, measures relating to cross-border transfer
of data are most likely to be examined under the GATS, 64
because digital data is usually transferred across borders
without requiring any transfer of physical commodities. 65 Other
WTO agreements may also apply, such as the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement)66 for the intellectual property invested in the data
and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT
1994)67 in relation to digital goods, like software or music in
electronic format embedded in a physical medium such as a
63 Usman Ahmed & Anupam Chander, Information Goes Global: Protecting
Privacy, Security, and the New Economy in a World of Cross-border Data
Flows, 5 (E15 Expert Group on the Digital Economy, Think Piece,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World
Economic Forum, Nov. 2015).
64 See General Agreement on Trade in Services arts 1:1, XXVIII(b)., Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 284 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M.
1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. See also Appellate Body Report, European
Communities - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, ¶220, WTO Doc WT/DS27/AB/R (9 September 1997).
65 The issue of whether software embedded in a physical medium constitutes a
service or a good remains unresolved in WTO law.
66 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
67 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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compact disc. 68 Here we focus on trade in services. However,
similar issues may arise in the context of goods trade. For
instance, many e-commerce companies that deliver goods like
apparel, electronic devices, or books across borders also rely on
cross-border transfer of data. Below, we first address certain
classification questions before turning to the potentially
applicable GATS obligations and exceptions.
1 Problematic Classification under GATS: Mode of Supply
and Sector
If a WTO Member's data transfer restriction is
challenged as a violation of GATS, in order to assess whether
the restriction complies with the Member's applicable GATS
obligations, we must first consider two classification questions:
(a) the "mode" under which the data is transferred and (b) the
relevant service "sector." International transfer of data via the
Internet for any kind of service could be categorized as either
cross-border supply (mode 1: supply of a service "from the
territory of one Member into the territory of any other
Member")69 or consumption abroad70 (mode 2: "in the territory
of one Member to the service consumer of any other
Member"). 71 Simultaneous classification under both modes
could create difficulties in identifying the relevant
commitments of the Member when the commitments for the
relevant sector differ between the two modes. Thus, on one
view, for the purposes of legal certainty, mode 1 classification is
appropriate. 72 In U.S. - Gambling, the Panel and Appellate
Body addressed the cross-border supply of online gambling
services from Antigua to the U.S. under mode 1.73 However,
other modes may also be relevant. For example, in China -
Electronic Payment Services, the Panel-whose report was not
appealed-found that certain Chinese measures
disadvantaging foreign suppliers in the provision of certain
68 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of
TRIPS at the GATT 13 PROMETHEUS 6 (1995).
69 GATS art. 1, ¶ 2(a).
70 See Carla L Reyes, WTO-Compliant Protection of Fundamental Rights:
Lessons from the EU Privacy Directive, 12 MELBOURNE J. OF INTL L. 141, 149
(2011); SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, THE WTO, THE INTERNET AND TRADE IN
DIGITAL PRODUCTS: EC-US PERSPECTIVES 65-70 (2006).
71 GATS art. 1, ¶ 2(b).
72 Daniel Crosby, Analysis of Data Localization Measures Under WTO Services
Trade Rules and Commitment 3 (E15 Expert Group on the Digital Economy,
Think Piece, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development
and World Economic Forum, Mar. 2016).
73 Panel Report, United States - Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶ 6.285-87, ¶6.29, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R
(Nov. 10, 2014); Appellate Body Report, United States - Gambling, supra
note 37, at ¶ 215.
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payment card transactions, which may involve data transfer,
violated China's commitments under not only mode 1, but also
mode 374 (supply of a service "by a service supplier of one
Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any
other Member").7 5
Identifying the relevant service sector for the purposes
of GATS is also difficult. 76 A common classification approach
adopted by WTO Members in their GATS schedules is the
United Nations Central Product Classification (CPC),77 but this
system has not kept pace with technological developments. For
example, computer services and audio-visual services can now
be accessed through mobile networks. 78 Therefore, even
common services such as cloud computing, cloud-based apps,
and social network platforms, which are used by service
suppliers across different sectors, cannot be neatly classified
under computer services ("data processing services" (CPC 843)
or "data base services" (CPC 844)). Other categories for
classification of telecommunication services (CPC 7523, which
pertains to data transmission over mobile networks) may
become more relevant to such services. 79 Other contentious
classification issues arise with respect to different forms of
digital content that are frequently traded, such as online
publishing of audio-visual services and other media products.8 0
These kinds of uncertainties regarding classification may need
to await clarification on a case-by-case basis as further
disputes arise in this field.
The relevant service sector may also be affected by the
content of the data being restricted. In U.S. - Gambling, for
example, the relevant sector was 10.D: "Other recreational
services (except sporting)." 81 In China - Publications and
Audiovisual Products, the Appellate Body agreed with the
Panel that sector 2.D of China's GATS schedule ("Sound
recording distribution services") extended to electronic
74 See, e.g., Panel Report, China - Certain Measures Affecting Electronic
Payment Services, ¶ 8.1(f)(i), WTO Doe. WT/DS413/R (July 16, 2012),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/413r-e.pdf [hereinafter China --
Electronic Payment Services].
75 GATS art. 1, ¶ 2(c).
76 This problem was recognized in one early paper on the issue. See Tim Wu,
The World Trade Law of Censorship and Internet Filtering, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L.
263, 281-84 (2006).
77 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS STATISTICS DIVISION, CENTRAL PRODUCT
CLASSIFICATION (CPC) VER. 2 (Dec. 31, 2008).
78 For more discussion, see Lee Tuthill & Martin Roy, GATS Classification
Issues for Information and Communication Technology Services, in TRADE
GOVERNANCE IN DIGITAL AGE 157, 161 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds.,
2012).
79 Id. at 164.
80 Id. at 158-61.
81 See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States - Gambling, supra note 37,
at ¶¶ 158, 162
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distribution, 82 in relation to which certain Chinese measures
had restricted foreign involvement (in relation to mode 3). In
China - Electronic Payment Services, the Panel classified
services "essential to the processing and completion of
transactions using payment cards" as falling within sector
7B(d): "All payment and money transmission services." 83 Thus,
numerous service sectors are potentially relevant to cross-
border data transfer under GATS.
2 Most-Favored-Nation Treatment (GATS Art II):
Preferential Treatment
Subject to the issues of classification and relevant
schedule commitments just discussed, measures relating to
data transfer could implicate a range of GATS obligations.
Firstly, alleviating data transfer restrictions for particular
countries, as the EU did for the U.S. under the former Safe
Harbor agreement mentioned above, may violate the obligation
on all WTO Members to accord most-favored-nation (MFN)
treatment under GATS art 11:1.84 Those obligations are subject
to Members' listed exemptions under GATS art 11:2. In the
absence of a relevant exemption, relaxing or excluding
particular countries (or suppliers from particular countries)
from data transfer restrictions is likely to constitute more
favorable treatment contrary to GATS art 11:1. The member
providing such preferential treatment would then need to
justify that treatment, either under a general exception or a
national security exception of the kind discussed below, or
under the exception in GATS art V for economic integration
agreements.
3 Domestic Regulation (GATS Art VI): Burdensome
Privacy-Based Requirements
GATS also imposes general, non-contingent obligations
on all Members in relation to domestic regulation under art VI.
Under GATS art VI: 1, in those service sectors in which a
Member has made specific commitments (that is, market
access, national treatment, or additional commitments), the
Member must "ensure that all measures of general application
affecting trade in services are administered in a reasonable,
82 See Appellate Body Report, China - Publications and Audiovisual Products,
supra note 37, at ¶¶ 412-13.
83 Panel Report, China - Electronic Payment Services, supra note 74, ¶¶7.204,
8.1(b) (i).




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/4
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19
objective and impartial manner." 85 For those same sectors,
under GATS art VI:5(a)(i) (through its reference to GATS art
VI:4), Members must ensure that "licensing and qualification
requirements and technical standards" do not "nullify or
impair" its commitments, for example through the absence of
"objective and transparent criteria" or being "more burdensome
than necessary to ensure the quality of the service." 86
It has been argued that "the present interpretation of
Article VI . . . does not leave a wide discretion for national
legislators to introduce high privacy standards (for example on
sensitive data or registration of data collection)."8 7 Registration
and authorization requirements for data collection can
considerably increase costs of compliance for foreign service
suppliers. For example, requirements to obtain consent before
transmitting personal information across borders may be
complicated when information involving a range of actors is
relevant to a particular application or device.88 The likelihood
of violation will depend on the specific measure and the
surrounding circumstances.
4 Market Access (GATS Art XVI): The Problem of Zero
Quotas
GATS art XVI sets out the market access obligations
that apply according to the commitments made by a Member in
its GATS schedule regarding the relevant mode and service
sector. Unless relevant limitations or conditions are included in
the schedule, a Member that has made a market access
commitment to a given sector must not limit "the number of
service suppliers" (art XVI:2(a)) or "the total number of service
operations or ... the total quantity of service output" (art
XVI:2(c)). Significantly for data transfer restrictions, the
Appellate Body found in U.S. - Gambling that a "prohibition
on the remote supply of gambling and betting services" online
is effectively a "zero quota" in breach of GATS arts XVI:2(a)
and (c). 89
Similar reasoning could apply to any restriction on
cross-border transfer of entire categories of data, for whatever
reason, to the extent that these categories correspond to service
85 GATS art. VI, ¶5(a).
86 GATS art. VI, ¶ (4).
87 Rolf Weber, Regulatory Autonomy and the Privacy Standards under the
GATS, 7 AsIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. &PoL'Y 25, 37 (2012).
88 Usman Ahmed & Anupam Chander, Information Goes Global: Protecting
Privacy, Security, and the New Economy in a World of Cross-border Data
Flows 6-7 (E15 Expert Group on the Digital Economy, Think Piece,
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development and World
Economic Forum, Nov. 2015).
89 Appellate Body Report, supra note , at ¶ 373(C)(i), 238, 251.
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sectors or sub-sectors in which the relevant Member has made
market access commitments without relevant qualifications.
Thus, measures such as the EU Privacy Directive (discussed
above) could violate both the domestic regulation obligations in
GATS art VI and the market access obligations in GATS art
XVI. 9o In addition to those provisions, a WTO Member
imposing high privacy standards regarding cross-border
delivery of electronic services could violate its national
treatment commitments in the relevant sector under GATS art
XVII.91
5 General Exceptions (GATS Art XIV): Central to WTO-
Consistency
Even if a substantive violation of GATS might arise, the
effect of the exceptions clauses in GATS must also be
considered. Firstly, the general exceptions clause in GATS art
XIV is modeled on GATT art XX, such that the WTO case law
on each provision refers to that on the other, with parallel tests
applying under both. GATS art XIV provides an (apparently
exhaustive) list of 'general exceptions' from GATS obligations
in the following terms:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are
not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where like conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any Member of
measures:
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to
maintain public order; ...
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or
regulations which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Agreement including those
relating to:
(i) the prevention of deceptive and
fraudulent practices or to deal with the
effects of a default on services contracts;
(ii) the protection of the privacy of
individuals in relation to the processing
and dissemination of personal data and
90 Reyes, supra note , at 153-57.
91 Weber, supra note , at 32.
2017 201
20
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 19 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol19/iss1/4
THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY Vol. 19
the protection of confidentiality of
individual records and accounts;
(iii) safety; . . . 92
While the other paragraphs under GATS art XIV are less
relevant, paragraphs (a) and (c) may encompass certain cross-
border data transfer restrictions. In examining a challenged
measure under GATS art XIV, a WTO panel or the Appellate
Body would first identify the objective of the measure (taking
account of not just the respondent's declaration of the objective,
but also other evidence such as the legislative history,
structure, and operation of the measure) 93 and then determine
whether that objective falls within the general scope of the
relevant paragraph.
As regards paragraph (a), a data transfer restriction
could have a legitimate objective of protecting public morals.
Public morals in this context "denotes standards of right and
wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or
nation," 94 and WTO tribunals have given considerable
deference to governments in identifying their public morals and
the measures to be taken for public morals purposes. 9 5 Difficult
questions could arise concerning measures that appear to be
designed to restrict free expression or to repress political
dissent, perhaps contrary to norms of public international law,
including human rights law. 96 However, the WTO might not
need to deal with such questions directly, since the respondent
government is likely to put forward a legitimate objective such
as protecting public morals even if that is not the true
objective. GATS art XIV has a complex and demanding test for
compliance (as explained further below), which is likely to
reveal any use of "public morals" as a cover for protectionist
measures or for other objectives not recognized as legitimate in
GATS art XIV.
As regards paragraph (c), WTO Members have
previously faced difficulties in establishing that their
challenged measures were intended to "secure compliance"
with WTO-consistent domestic laws. Securing compliance with
an international law as such (rather than as implemented into
domestic law) would not bring a measure within the scope of
92 GATS art. XIV.
93 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.144, WT/DS400/AB/R
(May 22, 2014) [hereinafter EC - Seal Products].
94 China - Publications and Audiovisual Equipment, ¶ 7.759 (quoting Panel
Report, supra note , at ¶ 6.465)
9s See, e.g., U.S. - Gambling at ¶ 299; China - Publications and Audiovisual
Products at ¶ 7.766]; EC - Seal Products at ¶ 5.167.
96 SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 139 (2011).
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paragraph (c). 97 A domestic law that was inconsistent with
WTO law would also not meet the terms of paragraph (c). Thus,
although paragraph (c)(ii) refers explicitly to privacy,
confidentiality, and personal data, it would not necessarily be
an easier justification to make out than paragraph (a).
After identifying a measure falling within the general
scope of paragraph (a) and/or (c), a respondent Member would
also need to satisfy a "necessity" test, demonstrating that the
measures are "necessary to" achieve the stated objective. That
test "involves a process of 'weighing and balancing' a series of
factors, including the importance of the objective, the
contribution of the measure to that objective, and the trade-
restrictiveness of the measure."9 8 Most objectives are likely to
be accepted as important, particularly public morals and
privacy since they are explicitly recognized in the treaty text.9 9
The more difficult questions are likely to surround the
measure's contribution to its objective and its trade-
restrictiveness. The more a measure contributes to its
objective, the more trade-restrictiveness is likely to be
tolerated. Conversely, the more trade-restrictive a measure
(with an import ban being the archetype of the most trade-
restrictive measure possible, arguably corresponding to a
complete ban on cross-border transfer of particular categories
of data), the greater the contribution to the objective that the
respondent Member will have to demonstrate.
A requirement to store data locally may restrict trade
due to the difficulty faced by foreign firms in complying with
the requirement in a cost-effective manner. Unless locally
based, they are likely to be at a disadvantage when compared
to local firms. Multinational companies with models based on
centralization may also face somewhat higher costs in
complying with such jurisdiction- specific localization
requirements. At the same time, the contribution of such a
requirement to the goal of privacy or national security may be
compromised to the extent that it can be shown that server
localization actually compromises the security of data, by
97 See Appellate Body Report, Mexico - Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other
Beverages, ¶ 79, WT/DS308/AB/R (Mar. 6, 2006).
98 EC - Seal Products at ¶ 5.169 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea -
Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef ¶ 164,
WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); Appellate Body Report, United States -
Gambling, supra note 37, at ¶ 306; Appellate Body Report, Brazil -Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, ¶ 182, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
See also China - Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 37, ¶¶
239-42.
99 WTO tribunals have recognised a number of objectives as important (see, e.g.,
Appellate Body Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 172, WT/DS125/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001))
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preventing "sharding" 100 and increasing susceptibility to
malware and other attacks. These kinds of measures may
therefore face problems in establishing necessity under GATS
art XIV(a) or (c), depending on the specific circumstances and
available evidence.
If the challenged data transfer restriction nevertheless
satisfied the weighing and balancing test, a WTO panel or the
Appellate Body would have to consider-as a final element of
the necessity test-whether a less trade-restrictive alternative
existed that was reasonably available to the respondent
Member and that would make an equal contribution to the
identified objective. 101 Several alternatives to data localization
may be possible, such as end-to-end encryption technologies. 1 02
Alternatives to banning cross-border data transfer for privacy
purposes could include employing consent mechanisms for use
of data or remedial measures such as providing individual
access to data to enable corrections. Fewer alternatives may
exist, however, to banning data transfer on national security or
public morals grounds, since it is the content of the data itself
that raises the perceived problem for states. 103 The availability
of such measures to a respondent Member would depend on
technical feasibility as well as the Member's financial and
professional resources. The outcome would again depend on the
particular nature and framing of the measure and the factual
circumstances.
If the challenged data transfer restriction was found
provisionally necessary under paragraph (a) or (c) of GATS art
XIV, the final question would be whether it meets the stringent
requirements of the chapeau of GATS art XIV. The Appellate
100 Data sharding "breaks off part of the data in a horizontal partition, providing
enough data to work with but not enough to reidentify an individual.". David
Geer, Big Data Security, Privacy Concerns Remain Unanswered, CSO (Dec. 5
2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134203/mobile-security/big-data-
security--privacy-concerns -remain-unanswered.html.
101 Appellate Body Report, Korea - Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, ¶ 166, WTO Doe. WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000) [herafter
Korea Beef|.
102 End-to-end encryption technologies enable data to be transferred
uninterrupted by the underlying communication networks (such as telecom
service providers or internet service providers) such that only the end
recipient can decrypt the data, thus ensuring the integrity of the data
through the process of transfer. Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What is
End-to-End Encryption?, WIRED (Nov. 25, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-end-to-end-encryption/.
103 More selective filtering may, however, assist a state to defend its blocking
measures. See Brian Hindley & Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Protectionism Online:
Internet Censorship and International Trade Law,6 (ECIPE Working Paper
12/2009), ecipe.org/publications/protectionism-online-internet-censorship-
and-international-trade-law; Claude Barfield, China's Internet Censorship: A
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Body has highlighted the use of the word "applied" in the
chapeau, 104 suggesting that it would consider how a data
transfer restriction is implemented and operates in practice.
Any apparent arbitrariness or discrimination in the application
of the restriction-for example, if exceptions to security or
privacy standards imposed on data transfer are made for
particular countries, or if established standards are not applied
consistently to each country from day to day-is likely to create
problems for its justification under the chapeau. The treatment
of domestic data transfer could also demonstrate
discrimination or arbitrariness, for example if local services or
suppliers are exempt from prohibitions on certain kinds of
online content.
6 National Security Exceptions (GATS Art XIVbis):
Limited Relevance
GATS art XIVbis preserves WTO Members' regulatory
autonomy in relation to national security, but it is limited to
particular circumstances. In particular, GATS art XIV bis:1(b)
provides that nothing in GATS is to be construed
to prevent any Member from taking any action
which it considers necessary for the protection of its
essential security interests:
(i) relating to the supply of services as carried out
directly or indirectly for the purpose of provisioning
a military establishment;
(ii) relating to fissionable and fusionable materials
or the materials from which they are derived;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or . . 105
Although this provision may be seen as "self-judging" because
of the words "action which it considers necessary," the inclusion
of the sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) significantly limits its
relevance to particular scenarios. Article XIVbis:1(b)(i) is likely
to cover data transfer restrictions in relation to digital services
provided in connection with military establishments, while art
XIVbis:1(b)(ii) would cover transfer restrictions related
specifically to data concerning fissionable and fusionable
materials. Article XIVbis:1(b)(iii) is more broadly worded and
could potentially justify a very wide range of cross-border data
transfer restrictions taken in time of war (which could perhaps
include civil uprising or cyberwarfare, to the extent that the
104 Appellate Body Report, United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, ¶ 22, WTO Doe. WT/DS2/AB/R (29 April 1996).
105 GATS art. XIV bis, ¶ 1(b).
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term "war" is inherently "evolutionary") 106 or other
international emergency. Some leeway exists for a WTO
Member to interpret such circumstances broadly, but they
would not seem to cover blanket restrictions on particular
types of data transfer operating on a routine rather than
exceptional basis.
These exceptions may be relevant to measures such as
the U.S. recommendation to telecommunications firms not to
purchase Huawei equipment, Australia's ban on such
equipment in its National Broadband Network due to concerns
of cyber espionage, or China's ban on several U.S. services, like
Microsoft Windows, in governmental agencies. 107 (Although
these measures are not per se restrictions on cross-border data
transfer, they nevertheless relate to cross-border data transfer,
illustrating the kinds of rationales and actions that a
government might adopt.) One author has proposed a principle
of good faith to assess whether a particular measure is
genuinely considered necessary for essential security
interests.108 Whether such a defense would be made out, in the
absence of a war or emergency, remains to be seen. WTO
Members may be reluctant to raise such matters in WTO
disputes for fear of further jurisprudential interventions on the
meaning of the national security exceptions. 109
7 Conclusion
Considerable uncertainty arises in applying WTO law to
Members' restrictions on cross-border data transfer, from the
initial questions of classifying the relevant products as goods or
services or within services, to the application of core GATS
obligations. The uncertainty and lack of specificity in WTO
rules in this area likely means that particular measures will
have to be assessed when a dispute arises, with much
depending on the interpretation and application of the
exceptions in GATS art XIV. In the absence of more specific
rules, arising from a failure to achieve consensus on how to
deal with these modern technologies and practices, Members
will have to accept and abide by the recommendations and
106 Cf Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 130, WTO Doe. WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12,
1998).
107 Shin Yi Peng, Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National Security
Exceptions, 18 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 449, 450, 453 (2015).
108 Id. at 466-68.
109 WTO members have shown a similar reluctance to challenge measures
purportedly justified by other exceptions, such as the exception for regional
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rulings of WTO Panels and the Appellate Body, as adopted by
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
B Remaining Gaps in TPP Provisions on Cross-Border
Data Transfer
1 Scope of Chapter 14 and Underlying Rationale
Due to the slow progress of negotiations on e-commerce
and digital issues within the multilateral framework of the
WTO, mega-regionals such as the TPP have become important
platforms to regulate restrictions on cross-border data transfer.
The TPP has introduced, for the first time, binding provisions
prohibiting data localization and imposing requirements on
cross-border transfer of data in the Electronic Commerce
chapter (Chapter 14) of the TPP. 110 If the TPP enters into force,
it will be the first trade or investment agreement to prohibit
interference with cross-border transfer of information by
electronic means. " Prior to the TPP, the Free Trade
Agreement between the United States of America and the
Republic of Korea (KORUS FTA) 112 required the parties only to
"endeavor to refrain from imposing or maintaining unnecessary
barriers to electronic information flows across borders." 1 13
The policy rationale behind TPP ch 14 is to facilitate an
open Internet and the free flow of e-commerce across borders.114
Article 14.2.1 confirms this rationale:
The Parties recognise economic growth and
opportunities provided by electronic commerce and
110 Certain exemptions were made: it was agreed that Australia would not be
required to change the stated restrictions on cross-border transfers of e-
health records of its citizens under domestic law, and Vietnam and Malaysia
were given an additional 2 years to comply with the provisions, during which
no legal action could be brought against them, under the dispute settlement
process. Vietnam also secured a 2-year extension in order to align their
server localization policies with the TPP provision to do away with
localization of computing facilities.
111 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement: an Introduction by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade'.
But see the PTA between the United States and Korea, art 15.8.
112 Consolidated KORUS FTA Text (signed on 30 June 2007, entered into force
15 March 2012) <https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/korus-fta/final-text>.
113 KORUS FTA art 15.8. See also KORUS annex 13-B, section B, which states:
'Each Party shall allow a financial institution of the other Party to transfer
information in electronic or other form, into and out of its territory, for data
processing where such processing is required in the institution's ordinary
course of business.'
114 Drennan et al, Privacy Law, Cross-Border data Flows and the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement, supra note 61.
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the importance of frameworks that promote
consumer confidence in electronic commerce and of
avoiding unnecessary barriers to its use and
development.
Chapter 14 applies "to measures adopted or maintained by a
Party that affect trade by electronic means," 115 but not to
government procurement 116 or to "information held or
processed by or on behalf of a Party, or measures related to
such information, including measures related to its
collection." 117 Thus, the chapter is focused on commercial
transactions, rather than government processing of
information. Measures requiring local storage of government
data will be unaffected, even where commercial entities are
engaged by or on behalf of the government to store the data.
Chapter 14 imposes a number of obligations and sets
out additional aspirational principles concerning electronic
commerce. For example, art 14.3.1 precludes a TPP party from
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions between a
person of one party and a person of another party. In the WTO,
a moratorium continues to apply on customs duties in such
circumstances, in the absence of longer-term agreement on the
matter. 118 Article 14.4.1 precludes parties from according "less
favorable treatment" to digital products of other TPP parties or
their citizens than "to other like digital products" (which would
include those of the first party and TPP non-parties),119 thus
encompassing both the national treatment and MFN treatment
limbs of WTO non-discrimination.
We now turn to the most important provisions of ch 14
for cross-border data transfer: art 14.11, which requires parties
to allow cross-border data transfer, and art 14.13, which
prohibits parties from requiring computing facilities to be
locally based.
2 Parties Shall Allow Cross-Border Data Transfer (TPP
Art 14.11)
Article 14.11.2 of the TPP provides:
Each Party shall allow the cross-border transfer of
information by electronic means, including personal
115 TPP art 14.2.2.
116 TPP art 14.2.2.
117 TPP art 14.3(b).
118 WTO Ministerial Conference, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce,
Adopted on 19 December 2015, ¶ 3, WTO Doe. WT/MIN(15)/42 WT/L/977
(Dec. 21, 2015).
119 TPP art 14.4.1, n. 4.
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information, when this activity is for the conduct of
the business of a covered person.
A "covered person" is exhaustively defined in art 14.1 to
mean a covered investment or an investor of a party, as defined
in ch 9 (Investment), or a service supplier of a party, as defined
in ch 10 (Services). Financial institutions are excluded, as
discussed further below.
The obligation in art 14.11.2 is qualified by an exception
that reflects in part GATT art XX/GATS art XIV, such that
TPP parties may adopt measures inconsistent with art 14.11.2
"to achieve a legitimate public policy objective," provided that
the measure:
(a) is not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade; and
(b) does not impose restrictions on transfers of
information greater than are required to
achieve the objective.
The term "legitimate public policy objective" is not defined,
creating ambiguity, particularly as the TPP parties may not
share the same values regarding data protection and related
questions. In a dispute under the state-state dispute resolution
provisions in Chapter 28, a treaty interpreter might turn to the
objectives of Chapter 14-and of the TPP as a whole-and also
to TPP art 29.3 for context. 120 That provision incorporates
GATS art XIV(a), (b), and (c) into the TPP, mutatis mutandis,
for the purpose of Chapter 14 (among others). Therefore, the
references in GATS art XIV to concepts such as public morals,
public order, privacy, and consumer protection may suggest
that these are legitimate public policy objectives for the
purpose of art 14.11.2.
The terms of art 14.11.2(a), which reflect those of the
chapeau of GATT art XX (and less directly GATS art XIV), may
lead the interpreter to refer to WTO jurisprudence on these
provisions as informative or as providing relevant
guidancel 2 1-a tendency that may be likely across the TPP
120 There is a separate international treaty, the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, that governs treaty interpretation issues such as how to interpret
ambiguous terms. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 31(1),
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)
[hereinafter VCLT].
121 For example, as evidence indicating the 'ordinary meaning' of the terms
under VCLT art 31(1), as 'relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties' under VCLT art 31(3)(c) (to the extent that
rulings adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body may be seen as a
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treaty, given the well-established WTO case law relating to
WTO provisions on which many of the TPP provisions are
based. The reference in TPP art 14.11.2(b) to restrictions that
are greater than required to achieve the objective might
similarly create a tendency to refer to WTO case law, for
example on GATS art IV:5(a)(i) or art 2.2 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade.122 However, even in the WTO, as
seen from the discussion of the general exceptions above, many
concepts remain elusive, including such common touchstones
as trade-restrictiveness. 123 Just as in the WTO, leaving too
much to be determined in a dispute by the meaning of the term
"legitimate public policy objective" may undermine the specific
nature of these data transfer provisions in the TPP. This
problem is exacerbated in both the WTO and TPP contexts by
the often-technical nature of data transfer and data security,
which is likely to fall beyond the expertise of trade tribunals.
3 Parties Shall Not Require Local Computing Facilities
(TPP Art 14.13)
Article 14.13.2 of the TPP states that prohibits
localization requirements as follows:
No Party shall require a covered person to use or
locate computing facilities in that Party's territory
as a condition for conducting business in that
territory. 124
However, like the primary obligation in art 14.11.2, the
prohibition in art 14.13.2 is subject to a qualification in art
14.13.2 (very similar to art 14.11.3):
Nothing in this Article shall prevent a Party from
adopting or maintaining measures inconsistent with
paragraph 2 to achieve a legitimate public policy
objective, provided that the measure:
(a) is not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
subsidiary means of establishing law under ICJ Statute art 38(1)(d), or
simply as supplementary means of interpretation under VCLT art 32.
122 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for
signature Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995),
annex 1A [hereinafter Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade].
123 See generally Tania Voon, Exploring the Meaning of Trade-Restrictiveness in
the WTO, 14 WORLD TRADE REv. 451 (2015).
124 Computing facilities are defined in the TPP as 'computer servers and storage
devices for processing or storing information for commercial use.' See TPP art
14.1. This definition incorporates cloud computing services.
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discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade; and
(b) does not impose restrictions on the use or
location of computing facilities greater than
are required to achieve the objective.
This broad exception suffers from the same difficulties as those
described above in relation to art 14.11.3, again limiting its
ability to facilitate cross-border data flows.
4 Exclusion of Financial Institutions from TPP Arts 14.11
and 14.13
The TPP requirements to allow cross-border data
transfer (art 14.11.2) and not to require local computing
facilities as a condition for conducting business (art 14.13.2)
are phrased with respect to "a covered person," making the
definition of covered person significant. Article 14.1 defines a
covered person as excluding a "financial institution," a "cross-
border financial service supplier of a party," and "an investor in
a financial institution." Thus, the data transfer and localization
provisions of TPP ch 14 do not generally apply to financial
services and institutions. Nevertheless, the TPP contains a
separate data transfer requirement for the financial sector:
"Each Party shall allow a financial institution of another Party
to transfer information in electronic or other form, into and out
of its territory, for data processing if such processing is
required in the institution's ordinary course of business." 125
(That provision goes on to confirm that TPP parties may in
certain circumstances restrict data transfer in order to protect
personal data, personal privacy or confidentiality of individual
records or accounts, or for prudential reasons.) The exclusion of
the financial sector from the more stringent localization and
data transfer requirements in the general Electronic Commerce
chapter has created some concern, leading to proposed changes
in other agreements as discussed further below.
5 Legal Framework for Protecting Personal Information
(TPP Ar t 14. 8)
Article 14.8.1 of the TPP recognizes "the economic and
social benefits of protection the personal information of users of
electronic commerce and the contribution that this makes to
enhancing consumer confidence in electronic commerce."
Accordingly, under art 14.8.2, each TPP party "shall adopt or
maintain a legal framework that provides for the protection of
125 See s B of annex 1 1B to the TPP ch 11 (Financial Services).
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the personal information" of those users. This obligation to
construct a legal framework may be seen as a way of
alleviating concerns about enhancing the free flow of data
among TPP parties. Rather than adopting data transfer
restrictions or data localization requirements in order to
prevent privacy breaches, parties allow data to flow to other
TPP countries subject to obligations on those countries to
protect that data. (Several other provisions can be seen in the
same light, such as the requirement to adopt consumer
protection laws in art 14.7.) In addition, art 14.8.3 requires
each party to "endeavor to adopt non-discriminatory practices
in protecting" e-commerce users from "personal information
protection violations." Article 14.8.4 states that each party
"should publish information" on how e-commerce users can
pursue remedies and how "business" can comply with "any
legal requirements."
Among the TPP parties, significant regulatory diversity
exists in relation to privacy and data protection. Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia have evolved privacy regimes; the U.S.
has an ad hoc regime with a mixture of sector-specific
regulations and self-regulatory codes; Vietnam has recently
implemented a law to protect personal information online; 126
Brunei Darussalam, meanwhile, does not yet have a privacy
law in place. 127 Thus, under note 5 to art 14.8, Brunei
Darussalam and Vietnam are not required to apply art 14.8
before they have implemented the relevant legal framework-a
rather circular note, suggesting that no deadline applies for
those parties. This exception may undermine the value of the
requirement to adopt a legal framework and other protections
under art 14.8, since the very countries that are lacking those
protections are the ones not obliged to impose them.
Article 14.8.5 recognizes that TPP parties "may take
different legal approaches to protecting personal information."
It therefore states that parties should "encourage the
development of mechanisms to promote compatibility" between
their different approaches to protecting personal information,
such as through autonomous or mutual recognition
arrangements or through 'broader international frameworks."
Similarly, in developing the legal framework, art 14.8.2
specifies that parties "should take into account principles and
guidelines of relevant international bodies." 128 However, no
126 Law on Network Information Security, 2015, Law no.: 86/2015/QH13, arts.
16-20, http://english.mic.gov.vn/Upload/VanBan/Law-on-Network-
Information-Security- 16-05-30.pdf.
127 See NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT, BUSINESS ETHICS AND ANTI-CORRUPTION LAWS:
BRUNEI DARUSSALAm 5 (2014),
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121089/business-
ethics-and-anti-corruption-laws -brunei-darussalam#section 14?.
128 TPP art 14.8.2.
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well-established international privacy standards have been
developed; nor does the TPP text specify any further
benchmarks for assessing legal frameworks developed by TPP
parties under art 14.8.2.
Some high-level principles have been adopted in bodies
such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) 129 and
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD). 130 The APEC Privacy Framework "is intended to
provide clear guidance and direction to businesses in APEC
economies on common privacy issues and the impact of privacy
issues upon the way legitimate businesses are conducted." 131
This framework is not legally binding, recognizes self-
regulatory standards as a form of privacy protection, 132 and is
based on broad principles including preventing misuse of
personal information, 133 providing notice to users regarding
collection and use of data, 134 accountability of data
controllers, 135 and maintaining integrity of personal data. 136
The OECD Privacy Framework, while based on similar
principles, contains stronger implementation guidelines for
member countries including development of national privacy
strategy alongside adoption of privacy laws and enforcement
mechanisms, 137 and providing notifications pertaining to data
breaches. 138 Although the APEC Privacy Framework is
supported by the US 139 and appears aligned with TPP art
14.8.2, its effectiveness remains debated. 140 Evidently, further
discussion of these kinds of standards and principles is needed
at the international level, not just in connection with the TPP
or the WTO, or trade and investment law in general, but more
broadly.
129 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, APEC Privacy Framework, APEC#205-
SO-01.2 (2005), http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-
Investment/-/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05 ecsg privacyframewk.ashx
[hereinafter APEC Privacy Framework].
130 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD
Privacy Framework (2013)
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd privacy framework.pdf [hereinafter
OECD Privacy Framework].
131 APEC Privacy Framework, 4.
132 Id. at 11.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 12.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 20.
137 OECD Privacy Framework, 17.
138 Id. at 16.
139 U.S. Examining How APEC Work Could Inform TPP Negotiations, WORLD
TRADE ONLINE (Mar. 5, 2010), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-trade/us-
examining-how-apec-work-could-inform-tpp-negotiations. U.S.
140 See, e.g., Joshua P. Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows and
International Trade, 2 ASIA & THE PAC. POL'Y Studies 90, 93-94 (2014); cf
Graham Greenleaf, Five years of the APEC Privacy Framework: Failure or
Promise?, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REv. 28, 29-33 (2009).
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6 Conclusion
The TPP introduces welcome specificity into the
international trade law field, providing clearer obligations and
principles in relation to data transfer than have previously
existed in the WTO or elsewhere. However, the inability of
even the 12 TPP parties to agree on precise requirements
means that several areas remain unaffected or subject again to
the discretion of those deciding TPP disputes, just as in the
WTO context discussed above. In particular, financial services
are excluded from the application of the two core data transfer
provisions (arts 14.11.2 and 14.13.2), those core provisions are
subject to significant questions about the meaning of a
"legitimate public policy objective" and the means justified to
achieve such an objective, and two parties are effectively
exempt from the requirement to establish a legal framework
for the protection of personal information. The TPP confirms
the difficulty in making progress on these issues in a
plurilateral or multilateral setting, while implicitly
highlighting areas that will need further work if trade and
investment law is to better support the digital economy.
C Developments in TTIP and TiSA: EU Position Precludes
Data Flow Provisions
After the TPP negotiations were concluded in October
2015, the possibility of establishing a side agreement relating
specifically to the financial services industry was brought up by
a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers, 141 to address the
problem of the exclusion from key data transfer and
localization provisions in the TPP text. The U.S. Treasury
Secretary Jack Lew referred to the difficult balance required:
preventing data localization requirements from being used as
non-tariff barriers, while making sure prudential regulators
have access data when necessary. 142 He adopted a cautious
approach to a side agreement, instead emphasizing the
importance of these discussions in informing future
141 Alex Lawson, Polls Call For New TPP Data Rules For Banking Sector, LAW
360 (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/745615/pols-call-for-
new-tpp-data-rules-for-banking-sector. See also Nigel Cory and Robert D
Atkinson, Financial Data Does Not Need or Deserve Special Treatment in
Trade Agreements, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION FOUNDATION
(April 2016), http://www2.itif.org/2016-financial-data-trade-
deals.pdf?_ga=1. 224805651.860038149.1486093734 (arguing that an
exemption for financial services data flows creates a policy loophole that
could be exploited by other nations).
142 See Lew Floats Possibility of Side Deal to Address TPP Data Localization,
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negotiations. 143 The U.S. Treasury, a group of U.S. finance
companies and U.S. lawmakers have since developed a
proposal to prohibit data localization requirements in the
financial services industry in ongoing and future trade
negotiations, to be enforceable through a state-to-state dispute
settlement mechanism. 144 The USTR has clarified that the data
localization issue for financial services will be resolved in the
TiSA and TTIP negotiations. For TPP parties not participating
in TiSA, the U.S. government will determine individual
arrangements to ensure that data localization restrictions are
not imposed in the financial services sector. 14 5 These kinds of
changes would enhance the possibility of further liberalization
of financial services.
Although the TPP has set some limited standards
regarding cross-border data transfer, it may not be easy for the
U.S. to negotiate for similar provisions in trade negotiations
with the EU such as the TTIP and TiSA. In light of the ECJ
judgment in Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, some
European Commission officials have taken the view that in
order to remain compliant with the data protection laws within
EU, the best policy option for technology companies is to store
the personal data of EU citizens within its borders.14 6 In spite
of strong pressure from the U.S., in the TiSA negotiations, the
EU has exhibited reluctance to change its position regarding
data localization and cross-border information flows. 147 The
May 2016 leaked draft of the TiSA also shows that the EU has
not offered any commitments regarding cross-border
information flows or prohibition of localization provisions, or
other related rules related to privacy, and transfer or access to
143 Lew Reiterates Possibility of TPP Side Deal, But Emphasizes Future Fix,
WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Mar. 23, 2016), https://insidetrade.com/daily-
news/lew-reiterates -possibility-tpp-side-deal-emphasizes -future-fix.
144 Len Bracken, Treasury Financial Services Industry Agree on Data Proposal,
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 25, 2016), https://www.bna.com/treasury-financial-
services-n57982073068/.
145 Data Fix Prompts Major Financial Services, Insurance Associations to Back
TPP, WORLD TRADE ONLINE (July 14, 2016), https://insidetrade.com/inside-us-
trade/data-fix-prompts -major-financial-services -insurance-associations-back-
tpp. U.S.
146 See Press Release, The Hamburg Commissioner for Data Protection and
Freedom of Information, Administrative Order Against the Mass
Synchronisation of Data Between Facebook and WhatsApp (Sep. 27, 2016),
https://www.datenschutz-
hamburg. de/fileadmin/user upload/documents/PressRelease_2016-09-
27_AdminstrativeOrderFacebookWhatsApp.pdf; cf Privacy Law, Cross-
Border Data Flows, and the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: What
Counsel Need to Know, KING AND SPALDING LLP (Nov. 10, 2015)
http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KSPublic/library/publication/ca111015.pd
f.
147 BRYCE BASCHUK, LATEST EU OFFER NOT NEGOTIABLE: TISA NEGOTIATORS SAY
(May 27, 2016) Bloomberg BNA WTO Reporter.
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source code in the Electronic Commerce chapter. 148 The EU
also holds a similar negotiating position in the TTIP
negotiations, including a rejection of the prohibition on data
localization in financial services. 149 Given that the EU is the
top exporter of digitally deliverable services, 150 its negotiating
position may have a strong impact on how data transfer
provisions are executed in future trade agreements. The
apparent ideological divide in this area between the EU and
the U.S. does not bode well for future progress.
IV DATA FLOWS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
Alongside trade law, the international investment law
regime is likely to play a key role in regulating state
restrictions on cross-border transfer of data. States may be
motivated to impose such restrictions by the same rationales as
discussed above, namely national security, public morals or
privacy. In the following sections, we show that a potential
claimant affected by state restrictions on data transfer would
likely be able to meet the preliminary hurdles of proving that it
holds an investment, in the territory of the host state, in order
to seek investment treaty protection.151 It is less clear, though,
that any violation of an investment treaty guarantee would be
made out. The outcome is likely to be highly fact-dependent,
with a claim for fair and equitable treatment, for instance,
being more prone to succeed if the claimant can demonstrate
that restrictions on data transfer were passed for political
motives or at short notice. If a violation is found, however,
states are unlikely to be able to defend their conduct by
reference to an exceptions clause in an investment treaty. Such
clauses, even where they exist, largely do not contain
exceptions relevant in the data transfer context, and are in any
case generally accepted to establish high thresholds. Lastly,
while more recent prominent trade and investment agreements
(such as the TPP) have included specific provisions on data
transfer, these are not likely to assist greatly in investment
treaty arbitration proceedings.
148 See Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Annex on Electronic Commerce, art
2 (2013), https://wikileaks.org/tisa/document/20151001 Annex-on-Electronic-
Commerce/2015 1001_Annex-on-Electronic-Commerce.pdf.
149 MICHAEL SCATURRO, EU TO PUSH FOR ITS DATA PROTECTION IN TRADE DEALS
(May 26, 2016) Bloomberg BNA International Trade Daily.
150 In 2016, U.S. exports of digital services were valued at USD $380 billion,
while EU exports were valued at USD $465 billion. See Id. U.S.
151 The claim must of course pass other jurisdictional hurdles not discussed here,
such as the existence of a bilateral investment treaty in force between the
home and host states.
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A Threshold Requirements: Complicated But Likely Met
1 Existence of an 'Investment' under the ICSID Convention
and the IIA
Any party wishing to bring a claim against a host state
under an investment treaty must fulfill the gateway
requirement that they hold an "investment," as defined by the
relevant international investment agreement (IIA) and, if
claiming under the auspices of the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), 152 as understood
in that Convention as well. It has proven difficult to classify
the legal nature of data in many contexts. 153 As noted above,
uncertainty remains in WTO law as to the proper classification
of data. It is also potentially unclear whether data counts as
property, and, if so, whether it is personal property or
intellectual property. However, many of these conceptual
difficulties are likely to be sidelined in the field of international
investment law. The protection of an investment treaty is
predicated on the existence of an "investment," a concept
broader than "property." An investment treaty claimant would
most likely not claim that particular data, the transfer of which
may have been restricted or interfered with, itself constituted
the investment to activate a treaty's protection. Instead, the
claimant would emphasize that tribunals have typically seen
investment as a holistic process, covering a range of activities
over time, potentially in different locations, and in a variety of
tangible and intangible forms. 154 Indeed, standard treaty
definitions of investment are inclusive and very broad,
frequently phrased as covering "all assets."1 55
Under the ICSID Convention, investment is often taken
to be a slightly more substantive concept, calling for some kind
of contribution from the investor and a sufficient level of risk
and duration. 15 6 It is difficult to assess these three so-called
152 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965), art 63
[hereinafter ICSID Convention].
153 For some difficulties in another area of international law, see Kubo Ma6ik,
Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpreting Computer Data as Objects
under International Humanitarian Law, 48 Israel Law Review 55 (2015).
154 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 61 (2d ed. 2012).
155 Id. at 63.
156 These limiting, "objective" requirements have also been applied by some
tribunals to the more expansive definitions of investment in investment
treaties as well. See, e.g., Romak S.A. v Uzbekistan (Switz. v. Uzb.), PCA
Case No AA280, Award, ¶ 207 (Nov. 26, 2009).
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"Salini" criteria in the abstract; 157 whether they will be
satisfied in the context of any particular data-related investor
will depend heavily on the specific nature of that claimed
investment. However, given the generally expansive
statements by tribunals, the ICSID requirements for an
investment might ultimately be readily fulfilled even by
investors in businesses relying heavily on cross-border data
transfer.
2 Investment "in the Territory of the Host State"
Apart from requiring an investment, treaties also
frequently require that the investment be made "in the
territory of' the host state. 158 In the context of businesses
relying on data transfer, this requirement is likely to be
difficult to separate from the fundamental requirement of an
"investment." The territorial requirement is connected to the
basic (though sometimes elusive) distinction between trade and
investment. Broadly speaking, while cross-border traders
operate from their home state even if selling goods or services
into another state, cross-border investment by its nature
involves more integration of business operations within the
host state. For this reason, without an investment in the host
state's territory, the would-be investor-such as a company
simply offering products or services for sale over the Internet to
consumers in another country-risks being viewed instead as a
mere trader, and thus ineligible to access investment treaty
protection.
In the view of the Bayview v Mexico tribunal,
it is quite plain that [the North American Free Trade
Agreement] Chapter Eleven was not intended to provide
substantive protections or rights of action to investors
whose investments are wholly confined to their own
national States, in circumstances where those
investments may be affected by measures taken by
another NAFTA State Party.15 9
Grand River Enterprises v USA also held that NAFTA did not
protect investments located in the investor's home state even
where those investments had been affected by measures taken
157 Salini Costruttori S.P.A. v. Morocco (It. v. Morocco), ICSID Case No.
ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 52 (July 23, 2001), 42 ILM 609 (2003).
158 CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN, LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 180
(2007).
159 Bayview Irrigation District v Mexico (U.S. v. Mex.), ICSID Case No.
ARB(AF)/05/1, Award, ¶ 103 (June 19, 2007).
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by authorities in another state. 160 Similarly, in another NAFTA
case, Apotex v USA, the tribunal found that preparatory work
completed in Canada by the Canadian claimant to meet U.S.
pharmaceutical regulations (in order to sell the products within
the US) did not count as an investment in the U.S. The
tribunal characterized Apotex's operations as consisting of
extensive investments in its home state of Canada, where its
products were produced, but as merely cross-border trade when
these products were exported to the U.S. Even the presence of a
U.S.-registered subsidiary based in Delaware, which served as
a U.S. distributor for the parent company's products, did not
convince the tribunal that there was an investment in the U.S.
Instead, the U.S. activity and the Canadian expenditures
"simply supported and facilitated its Canadian-based
manufacturing and export operations." 16 1
The businesses that rely most heavily on cross-border
data transfer in their operations are likely to be found in the
technology sector. However, it is also this sector that is perhaps
least likely to have a physical presence in the countries in
which it is able to operate, precisely because many of its
products and services can be delivered electronically via the
Internet. A company such as Dropbox, for instance, providing
"cloud" data storage facilities to individuals and businesses,
can offer its services to any Internet user worldwide, relying on
the possibility of transfer of the user's data out of its home
state and to Dropbox's servers in the U.S. 162 Indeed, in
February 2016, Dropbox reported that around 75% of its users
were based outside the U.S. 163 Even if Dropbox's operations
amount to an "investment" per se, it may be more difficult to
conclude that they amount to an investment in the territory of
any of the states of those non-U.S. users.
Such tech companies do, however, sometimes maintain
offices outside their home state to engage in activities related
to the core business, including marketing and business
development. Dropbox itself has recently opened offices in
Europe, Japan, and Australia for these purposes. 164 In many
160 Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd v USA, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 87
(Jan. 12, 2011).
161 Apotex Inc v. USA, UNCITRAL, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶
235 (June 14, 2013).
162 Where Does Drop box Store My Data?, DROPBOX, www.dropbox.com/en/help/7.
163 Thomas Hansen, Dropbox is Growing in Europe, DROPBOx BUSINESS BLOG
(Feb. 11, 2016), blogs.dropbox.com/business/2016/02/dropbox-is-growing-in-
europe.
164 Stuart Dredge, Dropbox Opens London Office and Buys Israeli Mobile
Startup CloudOn, The Guardian, (Jan. 22, 2015),
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/j an/22/dropbox-london-office-cloudon-
windows-phone; Thomas Hansen, Dropbox is Growing in Europe, DROPBOX
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cases, tribunals have been content to rely on the fact that the
claimant owned shares (even a minority share) in a company
incorporated in the host state. Given that investment treaties
commonly define investment to include shares in a company,16 5
the equity interest in the local company-often a subsidiary
investment vehicle specifically incorporated to conduct the
particular investment in the host state-is frequently
considered sufficient to meet the definition of investment under
the relevant IIA.166 Thus, marketing offices maintained by data
companies might assist in finding not only an investment, but
also an investment in the territory of the host state.
Moreover, other tribunals have favored a holistic
analysis to determine whether there is an investment in the
territory of the host state. For the CSOB v Slovakia tribunal,
for instance, "it was irrelevant whether particular aspects of an
investment were not performed within the territory of the host
State."1 67 Instead, what was important was that the claimant's
activity as a whole constituted an investment, with sufficient
connection to the host state to allow the territorial element to
be fulfilled. 168 The exact degree of host state connection
required was addressed in SGS v Philippines. In that case,
despite the fact that the claimant's services were largely
provided outside the Philippines, the tribunal emphasized
(amongst other factors) the existence of a "liaison office" in
Manila, employing a large number of people and substantially
coordinating the claimant's operations. 169 The SGS tribunal
concluded that, taken together, a "substantial and non-
severable aspect of the overall service was provided in the
Philippines." 170 Other cases, such as Fedax v Venezuela, have
suggested the need for a benefit to the host state, even if the
investment operations do not physically occur in the host state.
Meanwhile, the LESI v Algeria tribunal noted that
"[n]othing prevents investments from being committed in part
at least from the contractor's home country but in view of and
165 See, e.g., Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of India and
the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland for the Promotion and Protection of Investments art 1(b)(ii), Mar. 14,
1994, www.finmin.nic.in/bipa/United%20Kingdom.pdf..
166 For one recent example, see Kristian AlmAs and Geir AlmAs v. Poland,
UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 201 (June 27, 2016).
167 Christina Knahr, Investments "In the Territory" of the Host State, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR THE 21sT CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 49 (Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August
Reinisch & Stephan Wittich eds., 2009).
168 Ceskoslovenksa Obehodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovakia, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/4,
Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶ 89, (May 24, 1999).
169 SGS Soci6t6 G6n6rale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines (Switz. v. Phil.),
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 101 (Jan. 29, 2004).
170 Id. at ¶ 102.
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as part of the project to be carried out abroad." 171 The tribunal
added that preparatory spending and other intangible
contributions are often made in an investor's home state, but
are "no less destined for the country concerned [i.e., the host
state]." Although the LESI case related to a construction
contract, these comments are generalizable to other
investments as well, and would support data-related
investments with a less substantial connection to the host state
than more traditional investments such as in manufacturing or
agricultural industries. Furthermore, the EMV v Czech
Republic tribunal confirmed that a foreign investor's contract
with a local partner in the Czech Republic amounted to an
investment in Czech territory. The contract related to the
transfer of broadcasting rights, conferred by Czech authorities
under statute, from a Czech individual to the claimant. For the
tribunal, such a contract was "firmly anchored within the
territory of the Czech State." 1 72 Such views could support data
companies with similarly intangible rights by virtue of a
contract with a partner in the designated host state.
B Core Obligations: No Obvious Breach But Case-
Dependent
1 No Indirect Expropriation
For a claimant that manages to demonstrate the
existence of an investment in the host state's territory, the next
hurdle will be proving a violation of one of the guarantees of
the relevant investment treaties. Amongst the guarantees
typically found in IIAs, the protection against indirect
expropriation is likely to be prominent in any claim. An
investor affected by a state restriction on data transfer may
seek to argue that the restriction amounts to an indirect (or
regulatory) expropriation for which compensation is due. The
definition of indirect expropriation has, of course, long
remained controversial. Debates persist over whether a merely
adverse effect on the investor is sufficient to constitute an
expropriation, or whether an (possibly disguised) intention to
expropriate on the part of the state is required. Where the
effect on the investor is emphasized, it is not clear what degree
of adverse effect is demanded to cross the threshold from
routine, non-compensable regulation to impermissible
regulatory expropriation. A common formulation used in the
171 LESI SpA v. Algeria (It. v. Aig.), ICSID Case No. ARB/05/3, Decision, ¶ 73
(July 12, 2006).
172 European Media Ventures SA v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award
on Liability, ¶ 38 (July 8, 2009).
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case law, however, is that a "substantial deprivation" of the
investment will amount to an expropriation. 173 The
proportionality of the measure and the investor's "reasonable,
investment-backed" expectations may also be relevant to the
determination in some circumstances. These latter two factors
may be particularly relevant where the case is heard under a
more recent investment treaty that includes an interpretive
Annex on indirect expropriation, such as treaties concluded by
the U.S. since the 2003 U.S.-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement174 and U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement.175
Under a test of "substantial deprivation," at least some
of the measures most likely to be taken by states in the area of
data transfer may not cross the threshold to amount to
expropriation. The most prominent recent development in the
area, for instance, is the October 2015 decision of the European
Court of Justice to strike down the "Safe Harbor" agreement,
under which the personal data of EU citizens was permitted to
be stored in the U.S., as discussed above. Depending on the
implementation of the Privacy Shield (noted earlier), EU states
may be forced to impose data localization requirements-i.e., a
requirement to store data on servers physically located within
the EU-on companies dealing with the data of EU citizens.
These requirements will undoubtedly interfere with the
operations of businesses like Dropbox and its competitor Box,
which rely heavily on cross-border data transfer. However, both
Dropbox and Box have already taken steps towards reorienting
their business operations to store data locally (i.e., within the
EU). 176 The industry generally appears to have treated new
data localization requirements as merely a new headache to
deal with, rather than a fundamental shift in their operations
or a destruction of their ability to continue in business. 177 On
this view, data localization requirements are not likely to
constitute substantial deprivations. Similarly, a requirement to
gain additional, stronger consent from users before
transferring their data outside their home state is likely to be
construed as relatively minimal, and not sufficiently onerous to
amount to expropriation.
Restrictions or additional requirements placed on cross-
border data transfer might alternatively fall within the so-
173 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 154, at 104.
174 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, May 6, 2003, ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/singapore-fta/final-text.
175 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/chile-fta/final-text.
176 Hansen, supra note 165; Hayley Tsukayama, Box Teams Up with IBM and
Amazon to Solve a Major Data Storage Problem, WASH. POsT (Apr. 12, 2016),
www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/04/12/box-teams-up-with-
ibm-and-amazon-to-solve-a-major-data-storage-problem/.
177 The situation could, however, be different for smaller enterprises, less able to
bear the costs of data localisation.
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called "police powers" of the state. The doctrine of police
powers, now well accepted in international law, 178 suggests
that, as the Methanex tribunal put it "non-discriminatory
regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance
with due process . . . is not deemed expropriatory." 179 A tribunal
might view such restrictions, particularly where aimed at
maintaining privacy, national security, or public morals,
merely as ordinary laws falling within the host state's power to
regulate. Naturally, much will depend on the nature of the
exact measure at issue in a case.
2 Fair and Equitable Treatment
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation is
also likely to be relevant to an investment treaty claim relating
to data transfer, as it is in nearly every investment treaty
claim. As with indirect expropriation, the precise meaning of
the obligation is a matter for debate, with numerous entire
monographs dedicated to the question in recent years.180 Many
tribunals and commentators agree, however, that the concept
of legitimate expectations has "generally been considered
central in the definition of the FET standard, whatever its
scope." 181 On this view, states will breach FET if they resile
from expectations created by specific representations made to
an investor regarding a particular matter. 182 The FET standard
is also often applied to matters of process, including the
manner in which states pass new laws or take executive action.
In this sense, FET is allied to concepts such as transparency,
due process, good faith, non-discrimination, and non-
178 "[S]upport for the police powers doctrine appears to be overwhelming."
UNCTAD, Expropriation 85 (UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7, July 2012).
179 Methanex Corporation v. USA, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on
Jurisdiction and Merits, pt IV ch D ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005),. For a recent
application of the police powers doctrine, see Quiborax S.A. v Bolivia (Chile v.
Bol.), ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Award, ¶¶ 201-27 (Sept. 16, 2015).
180 See, e.g., I Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the
International Law of Foreign Investment (OUP 2008); M Paparinskis, The
International Minimum Standard and Fair and Equitable Treatment (OUP
2013); A Diehl, The Core Standard of International Investment Protection:
Fair and Equitable Treatment (Kluwer 2012); R Klager, Fair and Equitable
Treatment' in International Investment Law (CUP 2011).
181 Oxus Gold v. Uzbekistan, UNCITRAL, Award, ¶ 313 (Dec. 17, 2015). See, e.g.,
Michele PotestA, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law:
Understanding the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID
REV. 88 (2013).
182 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 154, at 145; CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN,
LAURENCE SHORE & MATTHEW WEINIGER, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 235 (2007).
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arbitrariness. 183 FET is not completely inflexible; tribunals
have acknowledged that "[n]o investor may reasonably expect
that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is
made remain totally unchanged." 184 The obligation may also
depend on the particular situation of the host state in question,
with less developed states potentially given some leeway in
their adherence to ideal FET principles.185
Measures taken against particular Internet services,
such as the ban imposed on Twitter by Turkey in 2014,186
issued at short notice and with arguably political motives, 187
may fall foul of FET obligations. Wholesale, drastic changes in
the applicable legal framework relating to data transfer or
Internet use might also violate FET. Given the breadth of the
FET standard, though, it is difficult to make general
pronouncements about its application in the data transfer
context.
3 Non-Discrimination
Investment treaties also provide guarantees of non-
discrimination to foreign investors. These guarantees (in
particular, the national treatment and most-favored-nation
guarantees) protect investors against discrimination on
grounds of nationality. Agreements between particular states
or groupings to bypass privacy restrictions in place for other
countries, such as the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor and Privacy Shield
agreements, could potentially raise similar questions of
discrimination under investment law as analyzed above under
trade law. However, non-discrimination guarantees in
investment treaties do not necessarily protect against
183 See, e.g., Electrabel, S.A. v Hungary 0, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Decision
on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability, ¶ 7.74 (Nov. 30, 2012);
McLachlan et al., supra note 183, at ch. 7, §2(A).
184 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic (Neth. v. Hung.), UNCITRAL,
Partial Award, ¶ 305 (Mar. 17, 2006). More recently, the Philip Morris v
Uruguay tribunal observed that, "generally, there must be a reasonable
expectation of regulation": Philip Morris Brands SArl v. Uruguay (Switz. v.
Uru.), ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Award, ¶ 269 (July 8, 2016); see also id. at
¶¶ 422-25.
185 Houben v. Burundi (Belg. v. Burundi), ICSID Case No. ARB/13/7, Award, ¶¶
185-88 (Jan. 12 2016); Nick Gallus, The Influence of the Host State's Level of
Development on International Investment Treaty Standards of Protection, 6 J.
OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 711 (2005).
186 Twitter website 'blocked' in Turkey, BBC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2014),
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26677134; Turkey Twitter ban:
Constitutional court rules illegal, BBC NEWS (Apr. 2, 2014),
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26849941.
187 According to the BBC, the ban was imposed following allegations of
corruption made on Twitter against the Turkish Prime Minister and his
inner circle. Twitter website 'blocked' in Turkey, supra note 188.
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differential treatment based on other grounds apart from
nationality. In certain markets relevant to cross-border data
transfer, such as the market for Internet search or social media
websites, there may effectively be only one participant. Any
state measure aimed at the Internet search market, for
instance, might appear to be a measure targeted at the single
participant in that market; if that participant is foreign-owned,
the measure may appear to be discriminatory. A tribunal may
nevertheless find that the measure is designed to meet a
justifiable regulatory need in the Internet search market, and
that the fact that its adverse effects are borne largely (or
entirely) by a foreigner does not suffice to make the measure
discriminatory. The Clayton/Bilcon v Canada NAFTA
tribunal, for instance, recently held that states can "pursue
reasonable and [facially] non- discriminatory domestic policy
objectives through appropriate measures even when there is an
incidental and reasonably unavoidable burden on foreign
enterprises." 188 The existence of any local comparators in "like
circumstances," as the requirement is often phrased in
investment treaties, and the tribunal's position on whether a
discriminatory intent against the foreigner is needed, 189 will
likely play a large role in any claim of discrimination in
relation to data transfer policies.
C Key Exceptions
Even if a tribunal finds a breach of an investment treaty
protection, the state may nevertheless escape responsibility by
means of an exceptions clause in the relevant treaty, or
(perhaps) by means of the customary international law defense
of necessity.
1 General Exceptions: More Restricted Than in the Trade
Context
Very few bilateral investment treaties contain general
exceptions clauses that cover all (or most) obligations in the
treaty, similar to GATT art XX or GATS art XIV, as discussed
above. However, such clauses are appearing more frequently in
recent treaties. A review by UNCTAD of investment
agreements signed during 2014, for instance, noted that a
general exceptions clause was found in fourteen of the eighteen
treaties in the sample, while the equivalent survey of treaties
188 Clayton v. Canada (U.S. v. Can.), PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on
Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 723 (Mar. 17, 2015).
189 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 154, at 203.
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signed during 2013 similarly located the clause in fifteen out of
eighteen agreements.190
Where a general exceptions clause does exist, it
typically clarifies that host states' obligations to protect
investors do not prevent the states from taking measures
necessary to achieve certain specified objectives. The relevance
of a general exceptions clause to an investment claim relating
to data transfer therefore depends on whether states are likely
to justify interferences with cross-border flows of data by
reference to any of those specified objectives. As mentioned
earlier, the objectives most likely to be supported by such
interferences are national security, public morals or public
order, and privacy. However, general exceptions clauses in
investment treaties usually list health and environmental
objectives, sometimes including protection of artistic treasures
and public morals or public order as well. Depending on the
content of the data being transferred, the public morals
objective could justify interferences, for instance with Internet-
based businesses relating to gambling or pornography. 191
Privacy, on the other hand, does not feature in the list; the
specific exception related to privacy in GATS art XIV(c)(ii) is
replicated only in a few IIAs that incorporate that provision by
reference. 192 National security also does not feature amongst
the enumerated objectives (although-as discussed below-it
appears relatively often in a separate, specific exception
clause). Because of this, general exceptions clauses as currently
drafted may not play a significant role in data-related
investment claims.
2 Exceptions for National Security: Rare and Uncertain
Application to Data Transfer
Investment treaties do, however, occasionally contain
specific exceptions for national security. Certain prominent
multilateral treaties, including NAFTA and the Energy Charter
Treaty,193 include a provision permitting a state party to take
any action "that it considers necessary for the protection of its
190 UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2015: REFORMING INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT GOVERNANCE 112 (2015) 112; UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT
REPORT 2014: INVESTING IN THE SDGs - AN ACTION PLAN 116 (2014).
191 See the discussion of "public morals" above in section IIIA5.
192 Panama-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 21, 2003,
www.sice.oas.org/trade/panre/panrc-e.asp; China-New Zealand Free Trade
Agreement, Apr. 7, 2008, www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements -in-force/china-fta/text -of-the-new-zealand-
china-fta-agreement/.
193 Energy Charter Treaty,,34 ILM 360, opened for signature Dec. 17, 1994,
entered into force Apr. 16, 1998, www.energycharter.org/process/energy-
charter-treaty- 1994/energy-charter-treaty/ [hereinafter E CT].
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essential security interests." 194 In one well-known example
from a bilateral treaty, art XI of the bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) between the U.S. and Argentina reads: "This Treaty shall
not preclude the application by either Party of measures
necessary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of
its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of
international peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests."1 9 5
As noted earlier, states may seek to justify restrictions on
cross-border data transfer on the grounds that national
security would be imperiled if foreigners gained access to
certain crucial data. A foreign-owned software company
operating in a host state might develop new encryption
techniques, for example, that it wishes to export to third states.
The host state might, however, object to the transfer of any
code containing the new encryption techniques to certain
"hostile" states, since this might interfere with the
effectiveness of the host state's espionage activities against the
hostile states. The host state's concern in this scenario would
lie not with any imminent or actual military invasion or violent
attack, but with a longer-term, more diffuse risk that its
security could be undermined.
A question arises as to whether a national/essential
security clause in an investment treaty would capture this kind
of security threat. Indeed, it has been argued that the essential
security clause covers only situations of "significant militaristic
threat,"196 thus being unlikely to justify preventive restrictions
on data transfer. In the Oil Platforms case, the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) placed an essential security clause in the
context of the use of force and self-defense, 197 suggesting that
long-term or non-specific risks to security may not be covered
by the exception. In the version of the clause found in NAFTA,
application is expressly limited to situations of arms traffic, a
"time of war or other emergency in international relations," or
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, none of which would
appear to relate to the restrictions on data transfer envisaged
here.198
Other versions of the security exception, such as art XI of
the USA-Argentina BIT, are not so expressly limited, and have
been applied in situations beyond military invasion and
194 NAFTA art. 2102; ECT art. 24.
195 United States-Argentina Bilateral Investment Treaty, Nov. 14, 1991, 2001-
2009.state.gov/documents/organization/43475.pdf.
196 William J. Moon, Essential Security Interests in International Investment
Agreements, 15 J. OF INTL ECON. L. 481, 499 (2012).
197 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 78 (Nov. 6)..
198 ECT art. 24 contains a similar list of categories of essential security interests;
although, it is only illustrative (rather than exclusive, like NAFTA), since it
is introduced with the word "including."
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violence. Many of the well-known Argentina cases, for instance,
applied the clause to an economic crisis, with one tribunal
commenting:
If the concept of essential security interests were to
be limited to immediate political and national
security concerns, particularly of an international
character, and were to exclude other interests, for
example major economic emergencies, it could well
result in an unbalanced understanding of Article XI.
Such an approach would not be entirely consistent
with the rules governing the interpretation of
treaties. 199
Indeed, restrictions on data transfer in the interests of national
security would arguably be closer to the intent of the essential
security clause than the restrictions on currency convertibility
adopted by Argentina and sought to be justified under the
same clause. Even if the clause is not taken to be "self-judging,"
it is by no means inconceivable that a tribunal might interpret
the clause to cover restrictions on data transfer.
Nevertheless, while the security exception might be
more common than a general exception, it is still far from
ubiquitous. A 2007 OECD study of 43 countries' BIT programs
found that 39 countries included no security exception at all.
Where the exception did exist, it was sometimes limited to
particular obligations such as expropriation. 200 The more usual
situation for states, then, is that no exceptions clause will be
available to justify restrictions on data transfer on grounds of
either privacy or national security. States' defenses will
therefore be likely to focus on arguments that their measures
did not constitute violations of investment treaty obligations in
the first place.
3 The Customary Defense of Necessity: A High Threshold
The potential relevance of the customary international
law defense of necessity must also be considered in this
context. This defense sits alongside any treaty-based defenses
such as the exceptions clauses just considered, and may
provide an additional avenue by which states can escape
responsibility for an interference with a data investor's rights.
However, it is often recognized that the customary defense is
difficult to satisfy, intended only for extreme cases.
199 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/8, Award, ¶ 360, May 12, 2005.
200 Katia Yannaca-Small, Essential Security Interests under International
Investment Law , in International Investment Perpsectives: Freedom of
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In particular, as codified in the International Law
Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, the defense
contains two requirements that may prove to be sticking points
for states seeking to rely on it in this context. Firstly, the state
must be facing a "grave and imminent peril." 2 01 As noted above,
the kinds of risks to national security that would justify
limitations on cross-border data transfer are not likely to
amount to grave and imminent perils, instead being more
diffuse, longer-term risks. It is true that the ICJ recognized, in
the Gabeikovo-Nagymaros case, that "a 'peril' appearing in the
long term might be held to be 'imminent' as soon as it is
established, at the relevant point in time, that the realization
of the peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less
certain and inevitable." 202 However, the indication that the
peril must still be "certain and inevitable" might limit the
usefulness for states of this view, since threats to national
security are most likely described in terms of risks rather than
certainties. Secondly, the state's response to the peril must be
"the only way" for the state to protect itself.2 03 Again, this is
difficult to prove, since states usually have a wide range of
possible actions at their disposal to respond to any given
situation.204 The success of the claim is likely to depend on the
particular reasons for which the state is seeking to limit data
transfers in the case at hand.
D Specific Rules on Data Transfer in the TPP: Inapplicable
As discussed above, the TPP and some other recent
preferential trade agreements (PTAs), including investment
chapters contain particular language relevant to data transfer.
Under TPP art 14.13.2, for example, states parties must not
impose requirements on investors to use or locate computing
facilities within a host state as a condition for conducting
business in the state. TPP art 14.11.2 imposes a more general
obligation for states parties to "allow the cross-border transfer
of information by electronic means, including personal
information," for the business purposes of a foreign investor.
However, these obligations are unlikely to be directly relevant
201 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art
25(1)(a). [2001] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, U.N. Doe. A/56/49(Vol. I)Corr.4,
legal. un.org/ile/texts/instruments/english/draft-articles/9-632001.pdf,
202 Gabeikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. V. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep.
7, ¶ 54 (Sept. 25).
203 Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra
note 202, at art. 25(1)(a).
204 The Continental Casualty tribunal acknowledged this, effectively finding that
the "only way" requirement could be read as the "only reasonable way" for a
state to achieve its objective: Continental Casualty Company v. Argentina
(U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 192-98 (Sept. 5, 2008).
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to a claim by an investor under the investment protection
provisions in TPP ch 9. Those provisions only allow TPP
investment tribunals to rule on claimed breaches of the
substantive investment obligations in ch 9 itself.205 An investor
could not therefore claim that a state had breached the
obligation to allow cross-border data transfer in art 14.11.2.
Instead, the investor would be confined to claiming that a
restriction on cross-border data transfer constituted, for
instance, an expropriation or a breach of FET in violation of
TPP arts 9.6 or 9.7.
Nevertheless, TPP ch 14 does provide some comfort to
investors in its treatment of the interaction between Chapters
9 and 14. While arts 14.11.3 and 14.13.3 contain exceptions to
states' obligations on data transfer and data localization, an
"exception" to the exceptions is effectively contained in TPP art
14.2, which provides that states' obligations on data transfer
and data localization are subject to the investment obligations
in Chapter 9. This means that, even when a state invokes the
exceptions in Chapter 14 (perhaps citing concerns of privacy or
national security), it may not have breached Chapter 14, but its
conduct can still be tested against the strictures of Chapter 9 in
a claim by an investor. The state would then need to
demonstrate that its conduct did not breach an investment
protection obligation, or to rely on an alternative exceptions
clause, such as the security exception in TPP art 29.2. As a
result, though, the TPP's innovative provisions on data transfer
are not likely to feature in investment claims.
V REFORMING TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW TO
FACILITATE DATA TRANSFERS: NORMATIVE ISSUES AND
POLICY OPTIONS
The previous sections of our paper highlight various
legal uncertainties and complications in relation to the
application of international trade and investment law to data
transfer. In this section, we turn our attention to normative
and policy reforms within these regimes that may help
facilitate data transfer. In order to maintain integrity and trust
in the global Internet, data transfers must be not only free and
open, but also secure and efficient. In practice, however,
achieving openness, efficiency and security simultaneously can
be challenging. As discussed in part II, this challenge is
already evident in the tussle between countries regarding the
extent to which governments should control cross-border data
205 TPP art. 9.18. This provision also permits tribunals to hear claims for
breaches of investment authorisations or investment agreements, but such
claims are not relevant for present purposes.
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flows to implement policy goals such as privacy, cybersecurity
or public order. Several questions remain unanswered,
including the appropriate standards and benchmarks
applicable to issues of consumer trust such as privacy and
cybersecurity, the extent to which governments should censor
online content to preserve public morality or order, and when
such policy measures simply constitute disguised
protectionism.
To achieve the goal of open, free and efficient data flows,
reformulation or creative interpretation of existing trade and
investment disciplines is necessary, in light of the realities of
the information economy. In order to synergize trade and
investment disciplines on data transfer with each other, and
with other facets of the information economy, policy-makers
will need to engage at two levels, to: (a) bring about necessary
legal and policy reforms within the individual areas of
international trade and investment law (what we term internal
engagement); and (b) coordinate and engage with disciplines
and institutions outside trade and investment law that impact
data flows (what we term external engagement). While the
political and cultural divide between countries on issues such
as privacy, censorship and surveillance will continue to pose
obstacles to a unified approach, this dual-pronged engagement
is likely to result in greater coherence in trade and investment
disciplines on data transfer.
A Internal Engagement: Creating Synergies in Trade and
Investment Disciplines
In the existing structure of trade and investment
agreements, the legitimacy of policy measures restricting data
transfer may fall to be determined under exceptions clauses
(such as GATS art XIV or art XIV bis, or a general exception or
security exception clause in a BIT). 2 06 Particularly in applying
GATS art XIV and similarly worded general exceptions,
tribunals have considerable discretion in assessing the legality
of a data transfer-restrictive measure. As discussed earlier in
part IIIA5, these exceptions entail stringent standards, and
several kinds of measures restricting data transfer, including
privacy and consumer protection measures, may fall afoul of
the GATS. For example, tribunals may find that: certain
administrative requirements are applied in a discriminatory
206 See generally Shin-yi Peng, Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National
Security Exceptions, 18 J. OF INTL ECON. L. 449 (2015). Note, however, that
general exceptions clauses are not as common in IIAs.
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manner; 207 the restriction fails to contribute to the policy goal,
such as preventing the public circulation of certain prohibited
material or protecting security of data; 208 or alternative
measures are available that are more effective in achieving
data security and privacy, such as implementing stronger
encryption standards.209
However, tribunals may lack the requisite knowledge of
foundational issues such as the efficacy of technical standards
on security and privacy, the economic impact of data transfer
restrictions, and the technical feasibility and reliability of
proposed alternative measures. Further, no international
consensus currently exists on cybersecurity standards and
privacy principles. Tribunals will therefore need to rely on
economic and technical evidence for the development of future
jurisprudence on exceptions clauses and their applicability to
data transfer issues. For example, a tribunal could consider
economic and technical evidence, where available, on whether
domestic servers are more secure or provide better economies of
scale, or whether a government can regulate online content in
accordance with its public morality without the need for large-
scale website blocking. Since the wording of exceptions clauses
typically predates the digital age, the existing jurisprudence
may become less relevant.
Even with the assistance of evidence from experts, the
complex technical nature of data flows and the dearth of
economic evidence on data transfer mean that tribunals are
likely to falter while balancing liberalization of data flows with
security and privacy. This deficiency indicates the need for
policy-makers to consider alternative tools to achieve the
desired balance between openness in data flows and
maintaining security and consumer trust. We have already
discussed in part IIIB how the TPP prohibits data localization
(TPP art 14.11) and mandates the free flow of information (TPP
art 14.13), as well as requiring TPP parties to adopt a legal
framework for protection of personal information (TPP art
14.8). The TPP's future may be uncertain, but some of these
rules are likely to spill over to other ongoing negotiations such
as TTIP and TiSA. These new-generation agreements,
therefore, may offer more specific provisions to deal with some
of the uncertainty in applying international trade and
investment law to data transfer measures. These specific
provisions allow countries to agree in advance on which
restrictions are acceptable and which are not, instead of
207 For instance, a requirement to register websites with a local authority, or to
obtain a domestic license to host content, may be comparatively more
burdensome for foreign service providers.
208 See text accompanying n. 38.
209 Tatevik Sargsyan, Data Localization and the Role of Infrastructure for
Surveillance, Privacy, and Security, 10 INT'L J. OF COMM. 2221, 2230 (2016).
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leaving the difficult balancing to be conducted by WTO panels
or investment tribunals on a case-by-case basis.
Given the centrality of issues of privacy, cybersecurity
and consumer protection in digital data flows and in digital
trade more broadly, these legal initiatives in the Electronic
Commerce Chapter of the TPP are welcome. Other trade and
investment agreements should aim to provide more legal
avenues to recognize the importance of these policy measures
at multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels. At the
multilateral level, a separate annex on electronic commerce
might be developed under the GATS, incorporating principles
to facilitate free, efficient, and secure data flows. Alternatively,
new provisions on domestic regulation in the electronic
commerce sector might be developed under GATS art VI,
setting out how fundamental principles on data transfer could
be implemented. Finally, provisions on secure and free data
transfers might also be directly incorporated in trade and
investment agreements through explicit provisions, as in the
case of recent mega-regional FTAs.
Another important legal reform is to build synergies in
the interpretation of international trade law and international
investment law, such that the legal outcomes under these two
disciplines are better aligned. As it stands, international trade
and investment law disciplines may apply differently to
identical measures restricting cross-border data transfer, for
example when comparing an investor-state claim under an IIA
with a state-state claim under the WTO or, perhaps, the TPP.
First, as discussed in part IVA, putative investments engaging
in cross-border data transfer will not necessarily have a
sufficient connection with their host state to qualify as
protected investments. Meanwhile, this threshold requirement
does not pose a problem for a claim by a WTO Member under
general GATS provisions (which could arise under modes other
than mode 3) or a claim by a TPP party under specific e-
commerce provisions. Second, international trade law and
international investment law do not typically contain the same
exceptions or deal in the same way with policy objectives
typically underlying data transfer restrictions, such as national
security, public morals, public order, and privacy. Aside from
explicit exceptions, which may be differently worded in the
contexts of trade and investment or play different roles in these
two contexts, implicit flexibilities may also differ. For example,
unlike WTO panels, investment treaty tribunals may
potentially draw on the doctrine of police powers to grant
flexibility in connection with substantive investment
obligations, given that these obligations have developed largely
in the absence of explicit exceptions.
Although the treaty language in trade and investment
agreements is not necessarily identical, lessons may still be
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drawn from jurisprudence in the investment context for the
trade context, and vice versa. The significance of and need for
such references between the fields is likely to increase as treaty
practices develop. For example, as general exceptions based on
GATT art XX and GATS art XIV become more common in IIAs,
the WTO jurisprudence on these exceptions-including
concepts of public morals and public order-may become more
relevant to certain claims and defenses in investment treaty
arbitration. Conversely, a future dispute involving GATS art
XIV bis could lead a panelist, arbitrator, or Appellate Body
Member in a trade dispute to have reference to discussions of
"essential security interests" in investment treaty arbitration.
Further, trade and investment obligations are being
increasingly integrated in new-generation agreements such as
the TPP and TTIP. These obligations will need to apply in a
coherent fashion to measures restricting data transfer,
precluding divergent legal outcomes in relation to data transfer
measures within the two fields.
B External Engagement: Achieving Coherence with Other
Disciplines
Although international trade and investment law are
becoming increasingly important in regulating data transfers,
these regimes themselves do not provide sufficient normative
principles and policy solutions to deal with all legal issues
related to data transfer. In order to resolve legal
inconsistencies or ambiguities within trade and investment
disciplines on data transfer (such as the interpretation and
application of exceptions clauses), external engagement with
institutions, and rules from outside trade and investment law
may be necessary. In particular, normative principles in
Internet policy-making provide an important tool for making
new rules and interpreting existing rules in trade and
investment agreements. For example, the principle of net
neutrality (allowing non-discriminatory access to all content on
the Internet, irrespective of who provides the content) is
important in enabling innovation and providing opportunities
to all service providers regardless of their country of origin or
economic size. Similarly, the OECD Principles for Internet
Policy Making seek to reconcile the free global flow of
information with privacy protection and Internet security. 210
In seeking greater clarity in trade and investment rules
on data transfer, policy-makers can engage with external
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bodies through various mechanisms. At the stage of drafting of
new rules on data transfer within trade and investment
agreements, participating governments can invite comments
from the Internet community after publicly releasing position
papers or early drafts. The ongoing work on data protection,
privacy, and cybersecurity at institutions such as the OECD,
APEC, UNCTAD, the International Conference of Data
Protection and Privacy Commissioners, and the Internet
Governance Forum would also be useful guidance in the
formulation of new disciplines in trade and investment
agreements. Other policy initiatives from industry and civil
society may assist in resolving issues with respect to data
transfer. For example, a process of data classification based on
the security and sensitivity levels of personal information,
advocated by Microsoft, may be more workable than a blanket
ban on data transfer. 211 Similarly, voluntary commitments
from companies, through programs such as the Global Network
Initiative, will be instrumental in maintaining the integrity
and efficiency of data transfers, while respecting local norms
and basic human rights. 212 Another positive industry
mechanism is the publication of Internet transparency reports
by Facebook, Google, Apple, Microsoft, and others, which
outline government requests for user data, thus creating
greater awareness of government surveillance activities.
Trade and investment agreements are not the
appropriate platform to set overly specific standards on
technical issues, such as cybersecurity, or to govern domestic
policy issues, such as privacy or consumer protection. Yet,
given the importance of the Internet in the global trade regime,
trade and investment agreements must provide adequate
"regulatory preconditions" to enable secure and open digital
data flows. Rules requiring the free flow of information and the
adoption of privacy laws, and the prohibition of data
localization as in the TPP, are an example of this. Moving
forward, trade and investment agreements can provide greater
clarity to data transfer rules by including references to high-
level principles without setting any specific standards. A
comparable example is the presence of high-level principles on
prudential regulation found in the recent FTA between Canada
and the EU. 2 1 3 Clarity on such principles can facilitate mutual
211 See, e.g., MICROSOFT INC,, A CLOUD FOR GLOBAL GOOD: A POLICY ROADMAP FOR
A TRUSTED, RESPONSIBLE, AND INCLUSIVE CLOUD 49 (2016),
https://news.microsoft.com/cloudforgood/_media/downloads/a-cloud-for-global-
good-english.pdf.
212 See, e.g., GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND PRIVACY https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php.
213 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the
European Union, revised text released by the European Commission, Feb. 29,
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recognition agreements between countries on privacy or
cybersecurity, some of the main barriers to free data flows.
These developments, inspired by work done outside the
typical trade and investment fora, can feed into the content of
future such agreements, and also into tribunals' deliberations
on the application of exceptions clauses or on doctrinal
flexibilities in connection with substantive obligations.
VI CONCLUSION
Trade and investment disciplines can support data
transfer by interpreting existing rules in the context of a
broader policy goal of open, secure, and efficient data flows. A
similar approach is warranted in the formulation of new
disciplines on data transfer in the new-generation FTAs. By
including more specific provisions to assist in liberalizing data
flows, agreements such as the TPP, if implemented, will
provide an important platform for building policy coordination
and consensus within and between governments on some of
these issues with respect to trade and investment. However, on
their own, and with the existing exceptions for particular
countries and references to international standards that have
not yet been fully developed, they are not enough.
A major challenge facing governments today is to
balance the liberalization goals of trade and investment
agreements with the much broader goals of digital data
management, including promoting domestic policy goals
unrelated to trade and investment. The changing nature of
investments and trading patterns in the modern-day
information economy needs to be better understood and
incorporated within both international trade law and
international investment law, in order to support liberalization
and growth of the digital sector. Quantitative and qualitative
evidence on the link between data flows, productivity,
innovation, and digital trade will help build a better framework
for policies on data transfer. 214 Further, greater policy
coherence is needed on a broad range of issues, including
cybersecurity and data protection.
The legal outcomes arising from the application of
international trade and investment law to issues of data
transfer do not necessarily align with each other. Despite the
different wording of trade agreements and investment
agreements, though, the jurisprudence developed in each
discipline may begin to influence the other, particularly in the
2016 (signed Oct. 30, 2016, not yet in force) , Annex XX of the Financial
Services Chapter, High Level Principles.
214 OECD, Economic and Social Benefits of Internet Openness 14 (Background
Paper for Ministerial Panel 1.1, DSTI/ICCP(2015)17/FINAL, June 2, 2016).
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interpretation of exceptions. For new-generation agreements,
where trade and investment disciplines appear to be
converging, the need to achieve harmony on data transfer is
growing. Coordination between trade and investment law will
help facilitate other developments such as e-commerce, cloud
computing, and 3D printing.
Although trade and investment law have a significant
role to play in facilitating the free flow of data, they cannot
address all of the complex issues arising from cross-border data
transfer. The development of further legal principles and
policies in respect of cross-border data transfer will need
support not only from governments and trade and investment
regimes, such as the WTO and TPP, but also from other
international bodies dealing with broader internet governance
issues, as well as industry and consumers. Trade and
investment agreements have the potential to encourage the
adoption of more transparent and predictable practices on data
transfer, as well as enhanced cooperation in developing
appropriate legal frameworks. At the same time, stakeholders
in the private sector and civil society will be critical in
establishing appropriate technical standards and related rules
and principles, policy, and practice.
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